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Warren E. Burger and Change in Legal
Education
By Dr. Jeffrey B. Morris
society with people-oriented counselors and advocates
to meet 'the expanding needs of our changing world."
In the tradition of Alfred Z. Reed and Jerome Frank,
Burger is sharply critical of the law schools' insistence
on "single-minded, rigid and universal adherence" to
the case method, which he calls the 'opinion' or
'appellate' method. For Burger, exclusvie reliance
upon the method of Langdell is a form of escapism,
taking students far from the realities of life and the grist
of daily practice. As a result, students can graduate
from law school able to give a lucid "dissertation on
refinements. of corporate spinoffs or vertical mergers:'
but unable"to advise a pregnant unmarried girl, or old
people needing help with social security." Surveys
support Burger's concern that students graduate from
law school poorly equipped to deal with facts, draft
documents, cope with clients, or negotiate with other
lawyers.
While acknowledging the need to improve education
in such areas of practice as counselling and
negotiation, Burger chose first to seek improvement in
the preparation of lawyers for trial work. Although
agreeing that America's best advocates are the equal of
. any, Burger believes, based upon his experience as a
trial judge, that "something less than half of the
lawyers who appeared there were minimally qualified
to perform their function."
Although the ordinary person hiring an attorney may
well believe that a law school graduate who has passed
a bar examination is prepared to perform reasonably
well to protect or vindicate his or her rights, Burger has

Among American Chief Justices perhaps only
William Howard Taft and Harlan Fiske Stone have
demonstrated as much interest in aspects of American
legal education as Warren E. Burger. None has devoted
as much effort to nudging legal educators, the bar and
the bench towards making significant changes in the
law school curriculum. Burger has inspired a major
debate over the question of the training of trial
advocates, stimulated the growth of courses in trial
advocacy taught by active practitioners, and called for
the teaching of legal ethics to begin on the first hour of
the first day of law school. Burger's prescriptions have
not been abstractions, but rather down-to-earth proposals, leavened by a belief in trying out new ideas as
experiments rather than casting them into stone for all
time.
Burger's interest in legal education first received
national attention when he addressed the American
Bar Association Convention on August 10, 1969, less
than two months after he had become Chief Justice. As
a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals,
however, he had expressed concerns a number of
times, most notably in speeches to the American
College of Trial Lawyers in 1967 and to the Phi Alpha
Delta legal fraternity in 1968.
The Burger critique of the state of American legal
education ought to be viewed from the perspective of
the standards he believes the bar, the individual
lawyer, and the law school ought to meet. He once
wrote that a strong, independent, courageous and
competent bar is an imperative for a free people (In re
Griffith, 413 U.S. 717, 732, 733 (1973)). To Burger,
lawyers must also serve as problem-solvers,
harmonizers, and peacemakers. They must act as
indispensable middlemen in the social process,
providing a lubricant for satisfactory disposition of
controversies and for gradual change in the law.
Burger is concerned, however, that the legal
profession has a monopoly over certain services. He
believes, therefore, that lawyers have a special
obligation to the public to produce the best system of
justice at the lowest possible cost. The operation of a
law school is a stewardship. Like other fiduciaries,
those running law schools ought to be accountable, in
this case -- to the public. Burger believes that the law
school is uniquely situated to shape the habits,
professional standards and ideals of prospective
lawyers.
The Chief Justice has commended law schools for
their abilty to teach students how to read and analyze
appellate opinions as well as for their ability to teach
principles of law. But he has argued that "the modem
law school is not fulfilling its basic duty to provide

The innovative moot courtroom is the home of a
unique seminar, Art of Advocacy, specifically proposed by the Chief Justice as"a prototype of ."legal
education for the next century and offered thIS past
year at Marshall-Wythe.
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stated that "if the concepts of recall applicable to motor
vehicles under government standards were applied to
law school graduates, the recall rate would be very
high indeed on those who go into the courts without
substantial added training."
. Surveys of state jU'dges, federal judges and lawyers
made in 1978 by the Federal Judicial Center, the
American Bar Association, Law School Admissions
Council, and the American Bar Foundation gave
support for Burger's view that there is a "serious
problem" of competence of trial counsel which is
directly related to the amount of attention given to trial
advocacy-related subjects in law school. The most
serious consequences of this problem--inadequate
representation, higher costs, and delays--are felt by the
'consumer.'
Burger's views of how lawyers should be trained
have been shaped by a number of experiences. They
have clearly been affected by his own training at the
William Mitchell College of Law where the teachers
were. largely leading practicing lawyers and sitting
judges (among them William D. Mitchell, later
Attorney General; Pierce Butler, later a U.S.Supreme
Court Justice; and Frank B. Kellogg, later Secretary of
State and Judge of the World Court). Later, Burger was
himself a faculty member at William Mitchell while he
was an active practitioner. Burger's outlook on the
training of lawyers was clearly affected by his
observations during twenty-three years of practice.
Repeated visits to England have deepened his
appreciation for the virtues of British legal education.
Exposure to the best kind of advanced medical training
at the Mayo Clinic, where he was a long-time trustee,
has sharpened his views of the value of the more
practical training doctors receive. He clearly has been
affected by what he observed while sitting by
designation as a District Judge in the District of
Columbia.
Burger clearly believes that law schools should
continue to educate in legal theory and analysis. But
they must not stop there. Training in the practical
aspects of lawyering should begin in law school and be
available to those students who want it. Experienced
lawyers and judges should be drawn into teaching,
working with the regular faculty. From the outset of
legal education, professors should help students to
become involved with hard facts and with the real
problems of people, for "that is what makes cases."
Like many students and legal educators, the Chief
Justice does not believe that it is necessary to devote
three years to the learning of the fundamentals of law
and the processes of legal analysis. In 1978 Burger
proposed to the American Law Institute that three law
schools attempt to teach the fundamentals (including
substantial advocacy-related learning) in. two long
years, leaving the third year (a full twelve-month
period) comparable to a medical internship, devoted to
involement in every phase of the litigation process
under the guidance of skilled trial advocates and law
professors.
In the John F. Sonnette Memorial Lecture. which

Burger gave at the Fordham University School of Law
on November 26, 1973, the Chief Justice proposed that
the first step towards certification of specialists be
taken with trial advocates. This led to a vigorous and
important debate. In the ferment which followed, the
Committee on Qualifications to Practice before the
United States Courts in the Second Circuit (Clare
Commiteee) proposed that courses in five subject areas
and participation or observation of trials be a
prerequiSite to admission before the courts of that
circuit. Chief Justice Burger appOinted· a committee of
the Judicial Conference, chaired by Chief Judge Edward
J. Devitt (District Judge for the District of Minnesota).
The Committee to Propose Standards for Admission to
Practice in the Federal Courts was made up of twelve
federal judges (ten of whom were trial judges), six
practicing lawyers, six law school deans and
professors. as well as four law student consultants.
After surveying all federal District Judges and holding
public hearings, the Committee reported to the Judicial
Conference in September 1979. Thereupon, the Judicial
Conference recommended to District Courts that they
adopt a student practice rule and support continuing
legal education programs in trial advocacy and federal
practice subjects, encouraging the practicing bar to
attend. The Conference also recommended that the
ABA consider amending law school accreditation
standards to require that all schools provide courses in
trail advocacy.
The Judicial Conference did not enact specific
admissions standards. Instead, the Conference
(continued on page 15)
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Student Legal Services:
Protecting Students' Rights
In September of 1978 Student Legal Services opened
its doors at 153 Richmond Road and began an
ambitious attempt to provide assistance with legal
problems for William and Mary students. Over the past
three years, the program developed and expanded as it
continued to provide much needed legal service to the
student community. SLS now consists of a sixty
member volunteer staff of interested law students from
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Under the
guidance and direction of the program's faculty
advisor, Professor John Levy, and SLS attorney Stephen
Harris of Williamsburg, the law student interns
research and investigate legal and quasi-legal matters
for students at the College of William and Mary.
Student interns assist clients with a wide variety of
legal problems. Although SLS does not handle criminal action and usually cannot represent a student in
court proceedings, the range of situations in which SLS
can and does offer aid is extensive. The most common
problems brought to SLS by concerned students involve landlord-tenant conflicts, auto repair and merchandise warranty problems, immigration and deportation issues, sales frauds and employment disputes.
SLS is extremely active in its attempts to inform students about their own legal rights and the procedures
that must be followed to protect those rights. Staff
members take personal interest in each client's case
and often very favorable results can be achieved in the
student-client's behalf.
The SLS Student Rights Branch developed over the
last year and has quickly become active in numerous
students' rights issues at the College of William and
Mary. SLS does not assist in conflicts between students
at the college. However, the Student Rights Branch has
been actively assisting students in disciplinary
hearings, honor code actions, grade appeals and
challenges to college policies. SLS interns have
represented numerous students before college
disciplinary councils and each semester more students
turn to SLS for assistance in defending themselves
against discipline charges prosecuted by the Dean of
Students' Office. Recently, law student interns have
been extensively involved with student complaints
against college grading poliCies and faculty hiring
policies. The grading policy problems will require
continued efforts by SLS interns and college administrators and hopefully, the results will be as successful
as the effort put forth concerning the college's faculty
hiring policies. The intense efforts of SLS interns and
cooperation of college administrators resulted in a new
faculty hiring policy being written and published in
the 1980-81 Faculty Handbook. Today, more than ever
before, student rights issues are being brought to the
forefront of legal and academic consideration and the
Student Legal Service program expects to continue and

increase its participation in advocating student interests and protecting student rights.
For the future, SLS has extensive plans to undertake
new endeavors and expand participation in issues
concerning students at William and Mary. Aided by
funding from the Board of Student Affairs, S18.plans to
publish several more pamphlets, similar to the the
Landlord-Tenant pamphlet published last semester.
These pamphlets will provide students with
comprehensive information concerning legal topics
that are particularly relevant to college students.
Student forums addressing specific areas of the law are
being planned to provide students at William and Mary
with easy access to information about their own legal
problems. In the spring, S18 will sponsor 8 regional
conference at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The
conference is a culmination of efforts by SLS interns to
initiate a communications and support network
involving student legal aid programs On college
campuses from Maryland to North Carolina. Successful
organization of such a program would add new
dimensions to the resources and services S18 could
provide for students at William and Mary.
The Student Legal Service program at the College of
William and Mary has enjoyed a productive and active
infancy. With the continued support of the College of
·William and Mary, the Marshall-Wythe School of Law
and the local legal community, SLS will continue to
provide students with assistance and guidance in the
protection of every student's legal rights.

Student Legal Service Offices at 216 Jamestown Road
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America's Shield Laws: Twenty-Six Variations
of the Newsman's Statutory Privilege
By Philip

J. Kochman

Introduction

Background

In 1972 the Supreme Court in Bronzburg v. Hayes·,
declined to affirm the privilege of a news reporter to
refuse to identify confidential sources of information to
a grand jury. In a five-to-four decision authored by
Justice White, the Court opened its opinion with an
unequivocal declaration:

The battle in America's courtrooms over a
newsman's privilege from testifying about sources and
information acquired in the process of newsgathering
began in 1848, but did not become a controversial issue
until the 1960's. Under President Nixon the Justice
Department sharply increased the use of subpoenas
against reporters, beginning with the 1969 trial of the
"Chicago Seven" for charges of inciting riot at the 1968
Democratic National Convention. During the 1960's
and early 1970's newsmen usually based their claim of
privilege on the First Amendment, relying on shield
laws to a much lesser extent.
In 1972 the Supreme Court addressed this
constitutional privilege claim for the first time. In
Bronzburg, and its two companion cases, United States
v. Caldwell and In re Pappus, reporters refused to
disclose certain information to grand juries based on a
First Amendment privilege. 1 The Court refused to
recognize any absolute or qualified privilege which
would protect from disclosure, under an agreement of
confidentiality, the criminal conduct of a reporter's
new sources of incriminating evidence against them.
The Court found that a reporter had the same duty as
any citizen to furnish information as a witness. Because
the First Amendment does not prohibit the enforcement of other general laws serving a substantial public
interest against the press, the Court ruled the
government's interest in law enforcement - the
investigation and punishment of crime - was not
outweighed by the reporter's speculative claim of a
"chilling effect" on the free flow of news to journalists
and the public.
Although the Bronzburg opinion dealt with grand
jury investigations, dictum in Justice White's opinion
strongly suggest that the majority's view of the
privilege extends to ciminal trials as welJ.3 When the
privilege is asserted in a criminal case the conflicting
considerations closely resemble those in the grand
jury." The need for obtaining evidence may be more
compelling in the criminal trial context since usually a
defendant's confrontation and compulsory process
rights are at stake when any privilege against testifying
is asserted.

The issue in this case is whether requiring newsmen to appear
and testify before federal and state grand juries abridges the
freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment.
We hold that it does not.

The Court refused to grant journalists a constitutional
privilege, but it did note that the States were free to
implement any sort of "shield law" considered
necessary or desirable.
Since Bronzburg the focus of the conflict between the
newsman's claim of confidentiality and the court's
need for information has been the state level. At the
time the Court decided Bronzburg seventeen states had
shield laws, and one, California, has incorporated its
statutory privilege into the state constitution. Judicial
interpretation of the privilege has also increased
sharply in the last eight years. Because Bronzburg
rejected the constitutional privilege, newsmen have
relied more-and-more on the states' statutory privilege
to support claims of confidentiality.
The twenty-six state privileges extend varying
degrees of protection to journalists. The laws differ
dramatically, offering various answers to the questions
of who should receive the privilege, what information
should be covered, and what showing, if any, is
necessary to overcome the presumption of privilege.
Other factors which may affect the application of the
privilege include the nature of the proceeding in which
the privilege is claimed and whether the information
sought has been published. Judicial interpretation of
the twenty-six shield laws had let to further variations
and unpredictability.
This paper will examine some of these state-created
privileges and their application by the state couts in
criminal trials. It is in this area that the privilege often
runs into direct conflict with the rights guaranteed a
criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment. It is also
in this area that the privilege has received its roughtest
treatment, often yielding because of narrow judicial interpretation of the statutes.
4

Shield Laws

But signs that the absolute status ofthe privilege was
not recognized in the state's court appeared quickly.
Barely two months after the 1977 amendments became
effective, a state Superior Court interpreted the statute
narrowly in rejecting a broad privilege. 6 The court
ruled that a newsman's taped conversation with an
alleged murdersT, part of which was published, was
not protected from discovery by the prosecutor.
Relying largely on United States v. Nixon the c~urt
found that the state interest in obtaining evidence In a
criminal trial outweighs the privilege. The court states
that since the source was no longer confidential there
could be no "chilling" effect. The court also found a
waiver of the privilege because a portion of the
inerview appeared in the Hackensack Sunday Record.
The New Jersey court applied a balancing test to the
broad legislative pronouncement with the scales
heavily tilted in the state's favor. In addition, the court
infused a very broad waiver concept into the privilege.
The statute did not mention waiver within its
provisions.
Within a year after this first decision the New Jersey
shield law suffered its total demise. The state's highest
court declared the law unconstitutional under the
confrontation clauses of the Unied States and New
Jersey constitutions. 7 The case arose when Myron A.
Farber, a reporter for the New York Times, undertook a
four-month investigation into a ten-year-old unsolved
mystery, the suspicious deaths of thirteen persons at a
small hospital in Oradell, New Jersey. The results of
this effort appeared in the Times. Four months later, in
May 1976, a grand jury indicted Dr. Mario E.
Jascelevich, former chief of surgery at the hospital.
charging him with five counts of murder by poisoning.
The grand jury did not call Farber as a witness.
At trial the defense counsel subpoenaed Farber. He
appeared' and testified abou't the access the state had
given him to its records during his investigation. He
declined, however, to speak about how he had obtained
a copy of a previously missing deposition of Dr.
Jascalevich claiming a privilege from testifying.
Next the defense demanded inspection of everythin.;
Farber had compiffid in the course of his investigation,
arguing Jascalevich would be deprived of his sixth
amendment right to compel testimony and confront his
accusers if Farber was adjudged privileged. The trial
court accepted the defense arguments and issued broad
subpoenas. In addition, the court refused to hear
arguments by the reporter and his newspaper ?n the
merits of a motion to quash the subpo.enas until they
turned over all of Farber's material for an in camero
inspection. When Farber refused to comply with the
subpoenas the Bergen County Superior Court found
them guilty of criminal and civil contempt. Farber was
jailed until he agreed to comply with the order. 8
The United States Suprllme Court refused to hear the
dispute,9 but on August 30, Farber's twenty-seventh
day in jail, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed to
hear the case. The state's highest court upheld both the
criminal and civil contempt judgments against Farber
and the New York Times. Here we can only focus on

State shield laws provide the media with the best
protection from the forced disclosure of information
acquired through newsgathering. Of the twenty-s!x
state privileges, only Michigan's cannot be asserted In
a criminal trial. But beyond this similarity, the other
twenty-five statutes differ widely in their language and
in the scope of their coverage.
Shield laws have been drafted using one of two
different means for providing the privilege. The
majority state that no rep.orter sh~l1 be compelle~ to
disclose information obtained during newsgatherIng.
The minority, which includes California and New
York, have statutes which state that no reporter shall be
held in contempt for refusing to testify. The difference
in wording has proved extremely important in the
courts. Courts in the minority group have used a
separation of powers approach to entirel~ c~rcumv~nt
the privilege in a number of cases. The majority versIOn
has been immune to such attack, but is vulnerable on
other grounds. Courts in these states have utilized the
sixth amendment or the narrow construction of specific
passages of the statute to avoid the privilege. But the
majority version has been more resilient to attack.
In order to analyze the different types of shield
statutes and their interpretations in the courtroom, the
privileges of four states - New Jersey an~ M~ryland
from the majority group, New York and CalIfornia from
the minority group - were selected for close scrutiny.
The four laws were selected because the statutes and
their interpretations fairly represent most of the
variations available among - the nation's privileges.
They were also chosen because of the reported material
available from the four states.
New Jersey
New Jersey had what many people conside«td the
nation's strongest shield law until In re Farber~ perhaps
the most important case in this area since Bronzburg.
Now the law has been amended to conform to the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision. The privilege was
reduced from an absolute to a qualified protection for
newsmen.
The New Jersey shield law was enacted in 1933, and
underwent a liberalization in 1977. The privilege
extended to all persons engaged in some aspect of
distributing information for the news media, which
included everything from weeklies and press
associations' to "other similar printed, photographic,
mechanical or electric means of disseminating news to
the general public." The privilege covered both the
source and the information, and both these terms were
given broad definitions within the statute. The
information did not have to be published to be
protected. Finally, the privilege could be asserted in
any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or investigative
body. The New Jersey legislature through its 1977
amendment of the statute, had fashiond the most
progressive privilege in the country.
5

evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the
materials sought are material and relevant, that they
cannot be secured through any less intrusive source,
and that the value of the material sought outweighs the
privilege. A trial court may rule on these questions
only after a hearing and it must make specific findings
of fact and conclusions of law with respect to its ruling.
The legislature also wrote a waiver provision into the
amended statute.
This new privilege received an immediate test. II A
trial court had ordered Robin Goldstein, a reporter, to
produce a letter sent to her by a prospective
prosecution witness for in camera inspection.
Goldstein based her refusal to testify on the 1980 law.
The trial judge denied the reporter a hearing on the
threshold issue. The state supreme court ruled that the
trial court had misapplied the new law. The court
found that the defendant had not shown that the
information was not available through a less intrusive
source. Here, the court pointed out, the witness was a
potential source of the relevant and material testimonv.
Perhaps most importantly as far as the new privilege
was concerned, the court pronounced that forced
disclosure to a judge prior to a hearing was a violation
of freedom of the press and impermissible.
After this ruling the trial judge again ordered the
reporter to testify. The New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the judge's order, again on the ground that
less.intrusive sources could provide the defendant with
the information he sought from the reporter. The defense tried to revive a broad waiver theory, but the
court was not dissuaded by the fact that the source of
the information was not confidential. The privilege to
withhold information granted by the shield law. the
court stated, "is that of the newsperson and not the
source."
New Jersey's statutory privilege for newsmen has
traveled a rocky road since 1977. The amendment of
that year made it perhaps the broadest privilege in the
country. The courts sharply limited the privilege
through the narrow interpretation of the statute and the
use of a balancing test which appeared heavily tilted in
favor of disclosure, either because of the state's interest
in investigating and prosecuting criminal activity or
the defendant's consitutional rights of confrontation
and compulsory process. The shield law's 1980 version
may offer a workable compromise. Under the statute
the court must provide the subpoenaed reporter with a
hearing in which the party seeking disclosure must
meet a three-part threshold test. Once the party seeking
disclosure produces a preponderance of the evidence
on the three questions the reporter must forward the
subpoenaed material to the court for in camera
inspection. The latest court decision indicates the
state's judiciary may work with, rather than against.
this version of the privilege. This case indicates that
the requirement of a hearing will be strictly applied
and that at such a hearing the party seeking disclosure
must present more than a simple allegation to meet the
standard for overriding the privilege. If the state's
courts adhere to this approach newsmen may receive

the parts of the opinion dealing with the state's shield
law.
The Court acknowledged that the privilege which
Farber asserted was, "as strongly worded as any in the
country," and that the legislature clearly intended to
extend the press a broad privilege, but that the shield
law had to be examined in light of the sixth
amendment to the Constitution and article 1, paragraph
10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The court easily
resolved the conflict between the reporter's statutory
privilege and the defendant's right to evidence in favor
of the latter. The court interpreted article 1, paragraph
10, of the state constitution - which uses the exact same
language as the Constitution's confrontation and compulsory process clauses - as "affording a defendant in a
criminal prosecution the right to compel the
attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents and other material for which he may have,
or may believe he has, a legitimate need in preparing or
undertaking his defense." The majority did not attempt
to resolve the conflict created between the defendant's
rights and other statutory testimonial privileges.
The court ruled that although a full hearing on the
issues or relevancy, materiality, and overbreadth of the
subpoena should be granted, the Times and Farber had
"aborted" it by refusing to submit the materials for in
camera inspection. The majority viewed such an
inspection as merely a procedural tool to ascertain
relevancy and materiality, and not in itself an invasion
of privacy. The court did acknowledge that the party
opposing the subpoena ought to be .afforded a
preliminary determination before being compelled to
submit the subpoenaed information. To meet this
threshold standard the defendant seeking disclosure
must show," by a fair preponderance of the evidence
including all reasonable inferences that he has met the
requirement of a three-part test derived from Justice
Stewart's dissent in Branzburg.lo The court emphasized that this was 11,0t, "a license for fishing expeditions."
But it concluded that in this case there was sufficient
evidence presented by the defendant to mellt this
three-part test.
Farber turned what had once been considered a fairly
absolute privilege into a qualified protection for
newsmen based on a balancing test - a three-part
threshold determination of whether the need for the
evidence overcomes the privilege. Many commentators
argue that the Branzburg Court had such an approach
in mind when it noted that state shield laws had to be
written within constitutional bounds.
Unfortunately for Farber and the Times the court
really avoided using the formula it set up. It decided
primarily on a waiver theory that no preliminary
hearing was necessary in this case until the material
was turned over to the trial judge for in camera inspection. The threshold test, as had been the words of the
shield law, could be ignored.
The New Jersey legislature reacted to the Farber
decision early last year when it amended the statutory
privilege to conform to the opinion. The statute
requires that a party seeking enforcement of the
subpoena must show by a preponderance of the
6

the protection of the statutory privilege unless the
defendant's sixth amendment rights are in jeopardy, a
point at which even the New York Times has conceded
the privilege must yield.

with a strict construction of the statute.
Since Ughtman the state's shield law has not
undergone much litigation. In 1979 the court's
statutory analysis in Lightman was applied to criminal
and civil trials. 14 In addition the court reaffirmed that
confidentiality between reporter and source was not a
major factor in determining the existence of the
privilege. The state's attorney general;s office also
offered a narrow interpretation of the Maryland shield
law. It issued an opinion in 1978 which indicated that
the privilege was limited to the sources of information
which was actually published or disseminated. 15
The New Jersey and Maryland privileges are quite
distinct from one another. While the New Jersey shield
law covers a broad spectrum of activities within its
purview, its application in every case remains subject
to a balancing test. In Maryland the privilege is much
more limited in scope, covering just major media
organizations and only the source of the information,
but this protection is considered absolute. Only further
litigation in each state will determine which approach
offers journalists the greatest protection.

Maryland
This state's statute is much more limited in its
coverage than the New Jersey law. In Maryland, only
persons engaged, connected, or employed with a
newsp~per, journal, radio, or television may assert the
statutory privilege. In addition, the privilege extends
only to the source, not to the information itself. Finally,
the information has to be obtained for the purpose of
publication or dissemination in order for any privilege
to exist.
The major shield law case in the Maryland courts has
been Ughtman v. Maryland,l2 decided in 1972. A
reporter for the Baltimore Evening Sun was sununoned
to testify before a grand juryl3 to testify about his
knowledge of suspected illegal drug traffic in Ocean
City, Maryland. Earlier the reporter had published an
article in the newspaper on the use of drugs in Ocean
City, and in it he described in detail an incident which
occurred in one of the city's head shops. The grand jury
asked the reporter for the location of the shop and a
description of the shopkeeper. The reporter refused to
answer on·the basis of Maryland's statutory privilege.
He claimed that the shopkeeper was his source and that
describing the location would in all probability lead to
disclosure of the souce. After a hearing the trial court
found the reporter in civil contempt, noting that there
was no evidence that the shopkeeper knew that he was
dealing with a reporter. The trial court determined that
the shopkeeper was not a source within the meaning of
the statute.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, while
acknowledging that the statute was absolute within the
sphere of its coverage, affirmed the contempt citation.
The court ruled that the privilege encompassed any
source of news or information without regard to
whether the source gave his information in confidence.
In addition, disclosure of the source couid not be
accomplishe~ by requiring the reporter to answer
questions· aimed, directly, or indirectly, toward
ascertaining the source's identity. Finally, the court
recognized that the privilege was vested in the
reporter, not the source.
But as the New Jersey court did in Farber, the
Maryland court in Ughtman ignored its broad legal
pronouncements on the statutory privilege, and
decided the· case on much narrower grounds. Here the
court ruled no privilege could be claimed:

New York
The New York privilege was enacted into law in
1970 and was amended once, in 1975, to include grand
juries. Although the statute was originally considered a
fairly strong privilege for newsmen, the New York
courts, construing the terms of the law narrowly, have
severely limited the protection, both in scope and in
application.
The New York shield law grants a protection to
professional journalists and newscasters from con·
tempt citations for refusing to disclose any news or the
source of such news. The information to be protected
must be obtained in the course of gathering news for
publication by the organization which employs the
reporter. The statute's definition of a professional
journalist is not as expansive as that of New Jersey's
law, but not as narrow as many others. The definition
of newscaster is quite broad; it includes anyone
engaged in analyzing and commenting on news. The
media groups within the purview of the privilege are
specifically defined, especially with regards to which
newspapers' reporters may assert the privilege. Thus
the scope of the New York privilege is somewhat
narrower than a majority of the other privileges.
The decision that set the tempo for judicial
consideration of New York's shield law was Wolf v.
People 16 decided in 1972. In that case the Village Voice
was held in contempt for refusing to comply with a
subpoena which ordered the newspaper to produce the
original manuscript of a "confession" it received from
a prisoner, the defendant in a criminal action for
kidnapping and coercion arising out of a prison riot in
the Tombs, a New York City jail. The Voice based its
refusal to comply with the order on the state's shield
law, arguing that the manuscript fell within a broad
interpretation of "news". But a state appeals court

Where a newsman, by dint of his own investigative efforts,
personally observes conduct constituting the conunission of
criminal activities by persons at a particular location, the
newsman. and not the persons observed. is the "source" of the
news or information in the sense contemplated by the statute.

The court stated that to rule otherwise would insulate
the information itself from disclosure, a result at odds

(Continued on page 28)
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Deep Seabed Resources Who Has The Right To Exploit Them
By Ray W. King

\
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\

Photo courtesy of Deepsea Ventures. Inc.
not subject to national appropriation. The belief was
that the world community should share the resources
and the profits derived from their exploitation. At the
same time, the estimated costs for making a mine site
commerically productive began to soar. Initial research
at a site could cost $150,000,000 and the cost to make it
productive could range from $500.000.000 to as much
as $1,000,000,000. Naturally, the mining industry
began to look for ways to protect its investment.
The controversy as to which policy should control
the taking of the minerals from the deep seabed has
recently come to a head and, as yet, is unresolved. The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
has recently completed drafting a proposed Law of the
Sea Treaty which strongly reflects the res communis
concept. At almost the opposite extreme, the United
States enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals
Resources Act which protects the national interest and
reflects the res nullius approach as to minerals
recovered. This article will briefly explore how the
concept that the deep ocean seabed belongs to
everybody relates to the proposed Law of the Sea
Treaty and the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources
Act and the continuing tension between supporting the
concept and wanting to protect national and industrial
interests.
The concept that the deep ocean seabed belongs to

In 1872 the British Oceanographic Ship HMS
Challenger discovered manganese nodules on the deep
ocean seabed. Manganese nodules contain manganese,
copper, nickel, and cobalt and lie just below or on the
surface of the deep ocean seabed at depths of about
three miles. Most are found in waters beyond the
jurisdiction of any state. The Pacific Ocean may
contain up to 1,500,000,000,000 tons of manganese
nodules with 10,000,000 tons being added each year by
chemical and biological processes--enough to meet
estimated global demand for the metals for many years.
Development of this resource came to serious
consideration in the 1960's. At present, only a few
nations are sufficiently advanced technologically to
have the potential capability to exploit the deep
seabed, and at best they are ten years away from
commercial exploitation.
When the Challenger discovered the manganese
nodules there was no doubt that the doctrine of res
nullius applied to them: the resources of the seabed
belonged to no one and whatever was recovered was
subject to national appropriation. Since that time the
status of the international law governing the deep
seabed and its resources was recognized, a consensus
began to develop in the international community that
the deep seabed and its resources should be subject to a
doctrine of res communis: belonging to everybody and
8

developing the law in this area.
At the close of the ninth session of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea the
participants had negotiated a draft of a comprehensive
treaty dealing with the law of the sea. Part XI of the
proposed treaty addresses the "Area"--the seabed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. When dealing with the deep
seabed the Conference was governed by the principle
that the Area and its resources are the common heritage
of mankind and all activities in the Area are to be
conducted for the benefit of mankind as a whole. An
International Sea-Bed Authority is established to
control all activities in the Area. All states parties are
members of the Authority and the Assembly, one of the
principal organs of the Authority. Much of the actual
regulation will be administered by another organ of the
Authority, the Council. Seats on the Council are
apportioned to assure that groups of states with special
interests are represented. The Authority, through
another of its organs, the Enterprise, is empowered to
carry out activities in the Area directly, including the
processing and marketing of minerals recovered.
The treaty establishes policies relating to activities in
the Area and sets up a system for regulating those
activities. In general the treaty provides:

everybody was first proposed to the United Nations
General Assembly in 1967 by Ambassador Arvid Pardo
of Malta. He suggested that the resources of the deep
seabed be regarded as the common heritage of mankind
and exploitation be conducted only by or under the
management of an international organization. The
United Nations was quick to approve the concept and
included it in General Assembly Resolution 2467
(XXIII). of 1968, U.N. DOC. A17477 (1968). The
resolution called for exploitation of the deep seabed to
be carried out for the "benefit of mankind as a whole."
Over the next several years, the United Nations passed
several resolutions endorsing the concept, among the
most significant being the Moratorium Resohition of
1969 and the Declaration of Principles of 1970. The
Moratorium Resolution, Resolution 2544 (XXIV), U.N.
DOC. A/7630 (1969), restated the benefit of mankind
theme and declared, first, that pending the
establishment of an international regime there was a
ban on all activities of exploitation of the deep seabed,
second, it was declared that no claims to any part of the
deep seabed or its resources would be recognized. The
Declaration of Principles, Resolution 2749 (XXV), U.N.
DOC. A/8028 (1970), declared the deep seabed and
resources that lay beyond any national jurisdiction to
be the "common heritage of mankind" and not subject
to appropriation. The Declaration of Principles and
subsequent General Assembly resolutions called for the
establishment of an international regime to control the
development of the deep ocean seabed. When the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
convened, the establishment of such an international
organization was on the agenda.
The United States was one of the prime motivators
behind the common heritage of mankind concept and
was a strong supporter of the Declaration of Principles.
When the Declaration of Principles was before the
General Assembly, there was no controversy surrounding support for the general concept and it passed without a single negative vote. The United States, however,
did strongly oppose the moratorium provisions of the
Moratorium Resolution and made it clear that the
United States did not consider itself bound by the resolution.
During this time, the mining industry was becoming
increasingly concerned about protecting its investment. In 1974 Deepsea Ventures, Inc., a United States
corporation, took a dramatic step toward this end. It
attempted to establish a right to a manganese nodule
mine site in the Pacific Ocean seabed. In a letter to
Secretary of State Kissinger, Deepsea Ventures gave
notice of its intent to assert an exclusive right to
evaluate, develop, and mine the manganese nodules in
a 60,000 square kilometer area. The letter asked all
entities to respect the exclusive right Deepsea Ventures
was claiming; however, Deepsea Ventures did
maintain that it was not asserting any territorial claim.
The Department of State responded by stating that it
did not grant or recognize exclusive rights to the deep
ocean seabed and the Third L'nited Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea was the appropriate vehicle for

* Activities in the area can only be conducted
pursuant to an approved plan.

* The Authority is the only entity that can grant
rights in the Area and it will issue licenses for
exploration and permits for exploitation.
* Production ceilings are established to control the

depletion of resources and regulate the market.
* Those exploiting the deep seabed will transfer
their technology to the Authority and developing
states.
* Those exploiting the deep seabed will share their
profits with the Authority.

The mining industry in the United States
vehemently opposes the proposed Law of the Sea
Treaty. The industry believes that the provisions of the
treaty are such that should it ever go into effect all
incentive to commercially invest in deep seabed
mining will be eliminated. The mining industry'S
objections to the treaty represent a partisan position but
they do have some substance and merit attention. First,
since the treaty does not contain a clause assuring the
recognition of interests already engaged in deep sea
mining, it does not adequately protect investments
made before the treaty takes effect. The industry
contends that there is no incentive to make large
capital investments now, when whatever advantage a
company gains may be taken away when the treatv
goes into force. Second, under the treaty there is n~
guaranteed access to the manganese nodules. The
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mining industry believes that it is essential to the
United States' security needs. and of course its own
economic needs, to have a guaranteed access to the
minerals. Access to the deep seabed is to be granted by
the Authority through the Council. United States
access to the deep seabed appears rather dim when one
considers that the Council can be controlled by the
developing and Eastern Socialist nations. Third. the
mining industry believes that the transfer of
technology and sharing of profits requirements of the
treaty mean that it will be supporting and funding a
?Iajor competito~, the Enterprise. Lastly. the treaty
Imposes production ceilings thus limiting the profit
the mining companies could make and further
redUcing the incentive to invest in deep seabed mining.
On June 28. 1980. President Carter signed the Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. 94 Stat. 553. The
stated purpose of the Act is to encourage the successful
negotiation of a law of the sea treaty and to establish an
interim program to encourage and regulate the
development df mineral resources of the deep seabed.
The Act establishes a system for allocating access to the
minerals of the deep seabed among United States
citizens and reciprocating states and sets up a
regulatory framework. The basic provisions provide:
*

A United States citizen may not engage in activity
in the deep seabed without receiving authority to
do so by being issued a license or permit under
the Act. from a reciprocating state. or under an international agreement.

*

The authorizations issued are exclusive.

sharing trust fund. the provisions represent the interest
of the mining industry. When the House of
Representatives was considering the Act it concluded
that the doctrine of res nullius applied to the resources
recovered. and the activities conducted under the
authority of the Act were permissible until a law of the
sea treaty takes effect and changes the doctrine.
Whe~ Con?ress passed the Act it was considering
the natIonal mterest as well as the mining industry's
concerns. Manganese. copper, nickel. and cobalt have
been identified as materials critical to the national
interest. They are metals important to the industrial
and military needs of the country and it is essential that
the United States have a secure supply to avoid
dependence on foreign sources in times of national
emergency. In passing the Act. Congress was recognizing that there was a need to secure a supply of these
metals and that such a supply can be obtained from the
deep seabed.
The controversy as to which policy will control the
taking of minerals from the deep seabed can be
distilled down to a conflict between the national
legislation and the international "legislation." The
common heritage of mankind concept is obviously
more favorable to the international community as a
whole; the continuation of the res nuJlius doctrine as to
the resources themselves is best when there are specific
national interests to be served. At the present stage of
the controversy, it is highly problematic that the
United States will ratify the provisions of the proposed
Law of the Sea Treaty that relate to deep seabed mining. Although the United States has endorsed the common heritage of mankind approach, in practical application it has favored continuance of traditional doctrines. The United States probably will not find any
agreement acceptable until there are reasonable assurances of access to the resources and some security is
provided the investments made by the industry. The
practical effect of the United States refusing to ratify
the provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty relating to
deep seabed mining could be relegation of the common
heritage of mankind ideal to the international archives.

* When nationals of other states interfere with
activities being conducted pursuant to an
authorization under the Act. the Secretary of
State shall use all peaceful means to resolve the
controversy.
*

*

The removal of nodules from the deep seabed is
taxed with the revenues going to a revenue
sharing trust fund which will be available to
Congress to make contributions under an international deep seabed treaty.

Note: As of this printing, the Reagan administration
has decided to block early completion of the Law
of the Sea Treaty.

No license or permit will be issued that will interfere with a similar authorization issued by a
reciprocating state.

Ray W. King is a second year law student from
Houston, Texas. In 1975, he received a B.A. in Political
Science from Texas Tech University. Ray spent the
next four years as a Naval Intelligence Officer serving
aboard the U.S.S. Independence and the U.S.S. Dwight
D. Eisenhower. Last summer. Mr. King was employed
as a summer clerk with the law firm of Vandeventer.
Black. Meredith and Martin in Norfolk. Virginia.

* Congress intends that any international agree-

ment to which the United States becomes a party
shall recognize the rights of United States
citizens who have engaged in activities under the
Act and provide security to those rights.
The United States mining industry supported the
Act and believes it provides the security necessary to
encouage investment in deep seabed mining. The Act
pays rhetorical deference to the common heritage of
mankind concept but. except for the tax and revenue
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Constitutional Amendments That Never Were
By Jon Bradley King
However, certain proposals have received the
requisite two-thirds vote of both the House and Senate,
yet have failed to win the necessary three-fourths of the
states to their cause. This article will discuss these
ill-fated measures: the constitutional amendments that
never were.
When the Founding Fathers brought forth their
work to the waiting world, the result was viewed by
some with alarm. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia,
proclaiming that a "coalition of monarchy men . . .
aristocrats and drones" had authored the document,
proposed a Bill of Rights as "necessary against the
encroachments of power upon the indispen~able rights
of human nature." Several states ratified the proposed
Constitution only upon the condition that amendments
be adopted to guarantee the rights of states and the
people in the new federal government. Alarmed by
demands for the convening of a new constitutional
convention. Rep. James Madison fulfilled the promises
made by his fellow Federalists during the ratification
campaign by introducing twelve proposed amendments to the constitution. The ten finally adopted,
better known provisions guaranteeing freedom of
speech and worship and the right to a jury trial, among
others, were well-received by most state legislatures.
Virginia's ratification of the Bill of Rights in December
1791, a contribution to the cause of civil liberty
. perhaps unsurpassed in the history of the
Commonwealth, brought the measures into effect. In
contrast. Connecticut, Georgia and Massachusetts
dawdled until 1939 before cautiously boarding the
ratification bandwagon.

The minute globe we inhabit has been partitioned by
the forces of language, religion and war into almost 170
?atio?-states. These sovereign entities, varying widely
In Size, strength and political system share one
common characteristic: each has a body of laws and
customs reflecting the collective perception of its
citizenry regarding the proper attributes of their
government, in short, a "constitution." In some states,
such as Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, the
fundamental law is not contained in a single written
text. In other nations, China for example, the
constitution is a veritable laundry list specifying in
wearisome detail precisely what the state is
empowered to do. While some countries revere their
constitutions and view alterations of the basic law with
great hesitancy, other states, such as strife-torn Bolivia,
have seen one military strongman after another
proclaim "constitutions" which endure precisely as
long as the current incumbent maintains his precarious
grasp on the presidential chair.
In all nations change is a constant. The Brazilians
and the Beninese, the Swiss and the Sudanese have
each seen fit to alter their constitutions to reflect their
changing conceptions of justice and political necessity.
If a nation is prone to political upheaval, the internal
mechanism set forth in a constitution for the
modification of its provisions may never be utilized.
However, if a constitution endures for a generation or
more the unexpected ambiguities in its text or the
changing views of the population will result in calls for
constitutional amendment.
Our federal con.~titution emerged from the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 which assembled
with a mandate to amend the flawed Articles of
Confederation. In the nearly two centuries since the
product of that gathering entered into effect, the
demand for alterations in the Constitution has been
constant. In twenty-six instances we have concluded
that changing our nation's basic law was desirable, if
not imperative. The Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction
Amendments, Income Tax, Prohibition, Presidential
Succession and the Eighteen-Year Old Vote chronicle
our country's evolution toward a "more perfect union."
Yet for every amendment ultimately adopted,
hundreds have fallen upon infertile ground. Scores
have been consigned to the tender mercies of hostile
committee . chairmen while others, labelled the
brainchildren of eccentrics, have been given prompt, if
not decent, burials. Amendments have been offered
with such diverse goals as prohibiting divorce,
preventing filibusters in the Senate, limiting
individual wealth to ten million dollars and banning
polygamy.

"The Lightning Speed of Honesty"
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Two of Madison's proposals failed to obtain
admission to the constitutional pantheon. The first
dealt with the apportionment of the House of
Representatives. The sole provision in the original
document on that subject was the "3/5 compromise"
under which 3/5 of "all other persons" i.e., slaves, were
to be included in the census totals utilized to apportion
the House. Some states, however, were hesitant to
allow Congress to set the ratio between Representatives
and the citizenry and urged that the formula of one
Congressman for every 30,000 persons be set forth in
the Constitution as well. After a series of tedious
debates which featured proposals to prevent the size of
the House from falling below 175 members, the
Congress submitted to the states an amendment reading:

reelection were lucky to escape the tar and feather.
Henry Clay himself waged a battle for his political life
by admitting that he supported the measure. Since that
era, the experience of Congressmen indicates that
many would be quite content if the inconvenient
matter of salaries was settled by a constitutional provision taking into account the vagaries of constituent
pressure and the ravages of inflation.
The next abortive addition to our Constitutional
scheme sprang from the meteoric career of Napoleon
Bonaparte. In 1799 the Corsican corporal ousted the
Directory, a band of lawyers whose shortcomings
would likely have defied the descriptive power of our
current Chief Justice. Firmly in control of France,
Bonaparte embarked on a campaign of conquest that
radically altered the face of Europe. Dynasties which
had reigned for centuries and an Empire which had
endured for a millenium tottered and fell within a
decade. In 1804, after a series of assassination attempts
had forcefully reminded him of his own mortality,
Napoleon adopted the hereditary principle and
proclaimed himself Emperor. Since an empire requires
a nobility, the accession of the corporal to the throne
mandated the elevation of his friends and relatives to
lofty positions. In addition, Napoleon instituted the
LElgion of Honor to reward valor. Soon a new nobility
had been established atop the ruins of the Bourbon
monarchies.
At this juncture, love and money entered. Finance
had proven a problem for American negotiators at the
French court, principally due to their failure to grasp
its essential function in the diplomacy of the
Napoleonic era. A conversation between Livingston,
the American ambassador to France, and Talleyrand,
Napoleon's foreign minister, will illustrate:

After the first enumeration, there shall be one representative for
every thirty thousand until the number shall amount to one
hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by
Congress that there shall not be less than two hundred representa·
tives nor more than one representative for every fifty thousand
persons."

The apportionment amendment came within a single
state of meeting the 3/4 ratification requirement.
Although only one state actually rejected the measure,
four states including the amendment's erstwhile
supporter, Massachusetts, failed to even consider it.
Historians have generally viewed the defeat of the
amendment as beneficial due to the undesirable
rigidity it would have imposed upon representation in
the House during an era of rapid demographic shifts
and a burgeoning population. Imagine the glorious
chaos that might have resulted had the amendment
been adopted in its original form. The ratio of one
representative to 30,000 constitutents may conjure up a
vision of Congressmen more responsive to constituent
needs and better able to represent the remarkably
varied American electorate. It should also bring forth
the nightmarish image of more than 7500
representatives (to serve the 226 million of us in 1980)
spilling forth from the Capitol Office Building into the
streets of Washington in a vain search for a desk or
parking space with the vague hope of introducing some
legislation should they ever have the opportunity. to
visit the floor of the House. It seems likely that when
the Framers voiced concern regarding "mob rule" they
never entertained the notion that the lower chamber of
the legislature might meet the criteria for that concept.
The second amendment offered by Mr. Madison
would have prohibited members of Congress from
granting themselves a raise "until an election of
representatives shall have intervened." Since the first
Congress provided only a modest per diem allowance
for its members, the need for this amendment was
dubious. Nonetheless, six states saw fit to ratify it while
five rejected it. The issue died down until 1816 when
the House voted itself the luxury of an annual salary.
The response from the electorate was a Nixonian
firestorm. Those representatives who dared seek

Livingston: "Can we sign a commercial treaty with you T'
Talleyrand: "Have you money?"
Livingston: "Money? But ... but" (sputtering)
Talleyrand: "The point is, do you have a lot of money? You see.
in my counlry it's very hard to do business. It takes a lot of monel'.
bUI if you have it. Ihere are no problems thaI can'l be ironed out.
Think aboul it."
(from Jean Orieux's TaJleyrond)

Livingston thought about it. Talleyrand got the money
and we got a treaty. Nonethless, there was growing
concern that when the representatives of our agrarian
republic went abroad, they might prove particularly
susceptible to gifts of appreciation from European
governments occasioned by their cooperative behavior.
Romance, not money or power, ruled the heart of
Napoleon's brother, Jerome. At the height of imperial
grandeur, he forfeited his opportunity for elevation to a
throne by fleeing to America where he married a
Maryland lady of aristocratic d~scent. His presence in
this country, aided by a series of bizarre political
machinations, led to the anti-nobility amendment.
The Federalist party, out of power since their
disastrous defeat in the election of 1800, sought to
smear the Jeffersonian Republicans by alleging that the

12

could have vetoed the election of an individual to the
Presidency or any piece of legislation antithetical to its
interests.
The ultimate fate of Congressman Vallandigham may
be worthy of reflection. In 1885, Vallandigham, then a
private citizen and practiCing attorney, was defe?di~g
a client charged with murder. He planned to mamtam
in his closing argument to the jury that had his client
handled the pistol in the manner alleged by the
prosecution, his client would have undoubtedly shot
himself not the murder victim. In a rehearsal the night
before his scheduled address to the jury, Vallandigham
used a loaded gun and produced dramatic, albeit
tragic, evidence to support his assertion.
The lame duck session of Congress which convened
in December 1860 witnessed a series of attempts to halt
the plunge toward war. Representatives from the
Border States, who were particularly concerned that
their homes might serve as battlegrounds, introduced a
series of proposed statutes and constitutional amend-

government was unduly sympathetic to French foreign
policy. The Federalist hoped that by introducing an
anti-nobility amendment they would arouse Republican opposition which they could then exploit by
publicizing their opponents' ties to the Bonapartes.
The concern that American diplomats might be
corrupted while abroad and the xenophobia present
during the period preceding the War of 1812
encouraged their design.
In 1810, Senator Reed of Maryland introduced the
anti-nobility amendment. The measure was to
supplement a clause in the original Constitution (Art. I,
sec. 9, cl. 7) which prohibits officials from accepting
titles or gifts from foreign governments without the
consent of Congress. As passed, the amendment read:
If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or
retain any title of nobility or honor, or shall. without the consent of
Congress, accept or retain any present, pension. office or
emouhnent of any kind whatever from any emperor, king, prince.
or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the
United States and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust
or profit under either of them."

The Jeffersonians failed to take the bait. Viewing the
amendment as harmless, they supported it. Several
states quickly ratified the proposal, which soon was but
one state short of meeting the 3/4 requirement.
The final chapter of this amendment's history is
fully in keeping with its convoluted origin. The South
Carolina Senate ratified the amendment and sent it to
the lower chamber for a vote. Had the South Carolina
House adopted it, the anti-nobility amendment would
have been enshrined in our Constitution. Instead, it
was misplaced. The federal government, believing the
ratification process complete, included it in the official
copy of the Constitution distributed to the 15th
Congress. Although the error was detected after some
investigation, the damage was done. It was printed in
several popular textbooks and, as a result, two
generations of American schoolchildren were taught
that the anti-nobility amendment had been incorporated into our fundamental law.
As for Jerome Bonaparte: he abandoned his
American wife and· returned to aid Napoleon at the
Battle of Waterloo, thus demonstrating his exquisitely
bad sense of timing. His wife died in a Baltimore
poorhouse in her 90's. Talleyrand died full of wealth
and honors. C'est la vie.
In 1860 America was tottering on the verge of civil
war. A series of secret conferences was held in the
interim between Abraham Lincoln's election and
inauguration in the vain hope of preventing secession
and armed conflict. The product of these furtive
attempts at compromise was a series of proposed
constitutional amendments designed to reassure the
Southern states that a Republican federal government
would not pose a threat to the status quo.
One particularly curious amendment was proposed
by Rep. Clement Vallandigham of Ohio, who urged that
the nation be divided into four regions: North, South,
West and Pacific. Under his measure, each region

Talleyrand
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was struck down as beyond the congressional grant of
power under the commerce clause.
Frustrated in its initial effort. Congress attempted to
evade the Court's pronouncement by attacking child
labor under the taxing power. A statute subjecting the
profits of industries employing children to a tax was
enacted in 1919. but in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co ..
253 U.S. 20 (1921) this measure was struck down as
well.
In 1924, the Progressives brought the ultimate
weapon against child labor to the fore. Rep. Foster of
Ohio and Sen. Shortridge of California introduced the
Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution. It read:

ments designed to produce a compromise between
North and South. Most of these measures sought to
clarify the federal government's power to regulate
slavery or the rights of states to leave the Union.
In February 1861. Representative Corwin introduced
a constitutional amendment which would have
prevented any attempt to abolish slavery in the
Southern states. It read:
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will
authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or to iqterfere
within any state with the domestic institutions thereof. including
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said state."

Section 1. The Congress shall h.ve the power to limit. regulate.
and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.
Section 2. The power of the several states is unimpaired by this
article except that the operation of state laws shall be suspended to
the extent necessary to give effect to the legislation enacted by
Congress.

The House passed the measure on February 28. 1861.
When the Corwin amendment was introduced in the
Senate. one Northern member sought to add a clause
denying the right of secession. The alteration was
defeated and on March 2. the Corwin amendment
passed the Senate with precisely 2/3 of its members in
support.
The legislatures of Ohio and Maryland ratified the
amendment. Illinois adopted it by way of convention.
the first state to employ this method of ratification.
However. the New England states resoundingly
rejected it. thus sealing the amendment's fate. The
shelling of Fort Sumter in April 1861 reduced the
hopes of compromise to ashes. and slavery perished in
the conflagration of civil war.
In the "Gilded Age" following the Civil War,
America lost its exclusively agrarian character and
launched the beginnings of its Industrial Revolution.
By the turn of the century, industrial centers had
sprung up throughout the Northeast and Midwest.
Relying on a huge pool of cheap labor composed
primarily of newly arrived immigrants from the
Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, the owners of
factories reaped tremendous profits.
The Progressive movement sought to halt the abuse
of labor and the pervasive political corruption which
resulted when private fortunes bought their way into
government. A series of constitutional amendments
were adopted due to the efforts of these refonners; the
income tax, the popular election of Senators. and
women's suffrage are the legacy of the Progressives.
However, the reformers of that era failed when they
sought to bring the amending process to bear against
the evil of child labor.
As early as 1906, measures had been introduced in
Congress to prohibit the use of minors in the work
force. Horrified by testimony that 1/3 of all children
between the ages of ten and thirteen were employed in
sweatshops. working long hours for a pittance. Congress first sought to address the problem via the Child
Labor Act of 1916. Under this statute. interstate and
foreign commerce were closed to the products of child
labor.
One day before the Act entered into effect. a U.S.
District judge in North Carolina granted a request for an
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the Child
Labor law. When the case reached the Supreme Court
as Hammer v. Dagenhart. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) the law

The amendment's opponents argued that the problem
of child labor was best left to the states. Alterations in
the measure to exempt agricultural workers and to
limit the coverage of the ban to hazardous occupations
were defeated and, on June 3, 1924. the amendment
was adopted by Congress.
In less than a year. a series of crippling defeats in the
states had ended all hope of ratification. By February
1925, more than thirteen states had rejected the
proposal; since it was thereby impossible to secure
acceptance of the measure by a 3/4 majority of the
states. the Child Labor Amendment langUished. A
motion to recall it to Congress was introduced but not
adopted.
In 1941, the Supreme Court. its membership altered
by the appointments of President Franklin Roosevelt,
overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart in United States v.
Darby. 312 U.S. 100. The ability of the federal
government to prohibit child labor under the
commerce clause was upheld. The adoption of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 and its ban on the employment of minors, thus rendered the Child Labor Amendment superfluous.
The 1960's witnessed another series of constitutional amendments on a wide variety of topics;
presidential voting in Washington, D.C.; the abolition
of the poll tax; presidential disability; and the
eighteen-to-twenty-one year old vote. However. the
wave of reform crested and ebbed in the 1970·s. Two
constitutional amendments proposed by Congress
aroused opposition in conservative states. and at this
writing. have failed to win ratification.
The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) passed in the
House and Senate in 1972 without strong opposition;
within three years 35 of the required 38 states had
ratified it. At that point, the amendment's progress
halted. Opposition in the South and Southwestern
states. grounded on the perceived threat of the ERA to
"protective" employment and marital legislation
prevented the measure from winning approval in
additional state legislatures. Although the ERA came
within two or three votes of ratification in Florida.
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Georgia and Missouri, and though the deadline for
state approval was extended to June 1982, it appears all
but certain that the Equal Rights Amendment will join
the ranks of the constitutional amendments that failed
to gamer the necessary support of 3/4 of the states.
In 1978, Congress adopted an amendment providing
representation for the District of Columbia. The
measure was passed over the opposition of those who
contended that it was contrary to the principle of
federalism to make the seat of government the equivalent of a state. This amendment read:

idealistic men are given substance as proposed
amendments to the Constitution. Most fall victim to
ideological opposition or to the more pragmatic
philosophy embodied in the old saw, "If it ain't broke,
don't fix it." For the few that surmount the hurdles in
Congress, the state ratification process serves as the
arena where the measure's opponents can battle against
adoption in the fifty statehouses across our nation.
By mandating rigorous requirements for amending
the constitution, the Framers sought to discourage us
from altering its provisions in the heat of political
passion, to the detriment of all. The adoption of a mere
twenty-six amendments in almost two centuries of
constitutional government is not merely testimony to
the wisdom of that cautionary device, but a tribute to a
citizenry which has come to view the amendment
process as the appropriate channel for efforts to make
our Constitution more accurately reflect our
fundamental values.

1. For purposes of representation in the Congress. election of the
. President and Vice-President. and Article V of this mnstitution.
the District ... shall be treated as though it were a state.
2. The exercise of the rights and powers conferred under this
article shall be by the people of the District ... as provided by the
Congress.
3. The twenty-third article of amendment to the Constitution of
the United States is hereby repealed.
4. This article shall be inoperative, unless it shall have been ratified ... within seven years from the date of its submission."

By 1981, eight states had ratified the proposal, but
bickering among District politicians lobbying for its
adoption, and the success of a referendum proposal
advocating statehood for the District cast doubt on the
amendment's prospects.
The story must not and shall not end here. Each year
thousands of measures are introduced to alter the text
comprising our fundamental law; the dreams of

Jon Bradley King is a third year law student from
Omega, Indiana. In 1978, he received an A.B. in History
and Political Science from Indiana University. Brad
studied at University College, Oxford, the following
summer and was employed by the Legal Foundation
for Personal Liberties, an activist law firm in San
Francisco. Mr. King is presently the American Bar
Association representative at the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law.

Burger.

home, church, or primary and secondary schools.
Neither can law schools anticipate all of the ethical
challenges that a career in practice can bring. But,
according to Burger, they still have a profound
obligation in the area of professional responsibility
from the outset of a student's education and
continuously to sensitize him or her to the ethical
problems to be encountered in his or her chosen
profession.
In the past twelve years there has been considerable
change in the training of lawyers. Many of these
changes--the multiplication of clinical programs and
courses in trial advocacy, rules permitting students to
practice in court, the development of internship and
externship programs--have been spurred and supported by Burger. As the nation's leading jurist, he has
been willing to invite criticism in order to focus
attention upon substantial problems and has
considered it his obligation to help to improve the
quality of the bar. He has been a significant catalyst for
change.

authorized pilot prorams in representative districts, so
that possible standards for the federal courts could be
assessed by evaluating the results from such differing
requirements as an examination on federal practice
subjects, a requirement of prior trial experience, and a
peer review procedure. An Implementation Committee
on Admission of Attorneys to Federal Practice to
oversee and monitor these pilot programs was created
by the Judicial Conference. The Committee Chairman is
Judge James Lawrence King of the Southern District of
Florida.
In the same year, 1979, a Task Force of the Section on
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the ABA,
chaired by Dean Roger C. Crampton of Cornell Law
School, made a series of recommendations including
that law schools offer instruction in basic litigation
skills to all students desiring it, and that they make
more extensive instructional use of experienced and
able practitioners.
Chief Justice Burger has expressed concerns about
law school training in professional responsibility. He
has asked whether it is "sound educational policy to
train people first in the skills of a professional
monopoly and leave it to some vague, undetermined,
unregulated, undefined future to learn the moral and
ethical precepts that ought to guide the exercise of such
an important monopoly?" Law schools cannot make up
for all shortcomings in early ethical training in the

For Further Reading; among the more important
presentations by the Chief Justice of his views on legal
education are: "A Sick Profession?," 5 Tulsa L.J.
1(1969); "The Special Skills of Advocacy," 42 Ford.
L.Rev. 227(1973): "Some Further Reflections on the
Problems of Adequacy of Trial Counsel," 49 Ford.
L.Rev. 1(1980).
Dr. Jeffrey B. Morris was a Judicial Fellow in the United
States Supreme Court in 1977-78, and has continued as
special research associate to the Chief Justice.
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Another Chapte
Marsh (
By Dr. Will
For more than 260 years--from early in the eighteenth
century to the final quarter of the twentieth--there has
been a traditional relationship at the College of William
and Mary between advanced studies in "liberal
learning" and the professional preparation for the
practice of law. The bicentennial of the formal chair of
law in 1779. observed in a series of academic events
during the 1979-80 year and climaxing in the
occupancy of the new law building in the summer of
1980. may best be understood as a watershed--on the
one hand. offering a perspective back to the earliest
days of the College itself. and on the other hand.
looking to the changing professional needs of the
future.
Part of the uniqueness of the new Marshall-Wythe
building derives from this retrospective and prospective character. Dominating the main foyer of the
building are the two colored-glass panels representing
Sir William Blackstone and Sir Christopher Wren. gifts
of the faculty of law at All Souls College. Oxford. in
recognition of the bicentennial of American legal
education. Through the doorways between these
panels. themselves reminders of the beginnings of legal
education. may be seen the National Center for State
Courts. a unique agency committed to the study of
practical means of improving the administration of
justice in all of the states for the future.
Blackstone and Wren are former fellows of All Souls
with close ties to the William and Mary story: Wren.
the great English architect. is credited with the basic
sketches for a "colledge" building which were then
"adapted by certain gentlemen of the country" (Le ..
colonial builders). Blackstone. the first occupant of the
Vinerian chair of English law. and author of the classic
Commentaries on the Laws of England. was. along with
his chair. the model in large part for the pioneer chair
of law at the Williamsburg institution 21 years later. A
small brass plate adjacent to the "Oxford windows"
describes the circumstances under which the All Souls
faculty arranged to make the gift of the windows early
in 1978.
But the association of advanced studies and
professional training goes back earlier than that. as a
companion brass plate indicates. At the end of the
seventeenth century. when the College was first
chartered. the Virginia colony was emerging from its
raw frontier character into something of a settled
tidewater society. with growing commerical economy
and the need for professional leaders in law and
government. For those who could afford it. and had the
ambition to do it. the reading of law at one of the Inns
of Court in London was a logical means of getting a
"head start" in what was beginning to be a highly
competitive society. Taking advantage of the new
16
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Swindler
educational institution--a "grammar" or preparatory
school complemented by what was a standard two-year
course of university-level study -- colonials could go to
London equipped to hold their own with students from
Oxford and Cambridge also enrolling at one of the Inns
of Court.
One of the earliest William and Mary students to
undertake this sequence of preparation was John (later
Sir John) Randolph, one of seven sons of William
Randolph of "Turkey Island," who attended the
William and Mary preparatory and, probably,
university courses of study between 1705 and 1713.
Randolph then traveled to London and entered Gray's
Inn on May 17, 1715. His "pre-legal" education, as well
as some practical legal experience he had between
1713 an 1715, paid dividends; Randolph was called to
the bar of the Inn two years later, well ahead of the
normal three-year study period; and by 1718 he was
back in Virginia ready to take his place among his
professional peers.
The Randolph tradition--one family's example
among others--substantially contributed to the
identification of advanced study and the law at
William and Mary. Sir John's sons, Peyton the Patriot
and John the Loyalist, both followed their father's
example of study at the College and qualification for
the bar at the Inns of Court. His grandson
Edmund--later to become the first Attorney General of
the United States--also attended the College, but read
his law under his father and uncle; for now, on the eve
of Independence, there were changes in the common
law as practiced in Virginia which foreshadowed the
need for an "Americanized" course of study.
In the Jefferson (rare book) Room of the law library
are portraits of Sir John Randolph and his grandson,
Edmund, visually commemorating the earliest
association of law and education at William and Mary.
Also in this room are representations of Thomas
Jefferson and John Marshall (both Randolph kinsmen),
in whose careers the transition to an "Americanized"
law and a course of study in "Americanized" common
law was to begin. Jefferson recognized that the
knowledge of the English parent stock was essential; in
writing about reading for the bar, early in the
nineteenth century, he urged four treatises as
fundamentaI--Bracton, for the common law as it was
epitomized in medieval times; Sir Edward Coke, for the
beginning of the Stuart age; Matthew Bacon, for the
state of the law after the Restoration; and Blackstone,
for the "modern" law.
But Jefferson also recognized that an American law
was essential for practical legal study--and who better
to offer instruction in such law than his own mentor,
George Wythe, who with Jefferson had been
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responsible for most of the famous "revisal" of the
common law after the Revolution? So Wythe, an
experienced tutor for a generation of aspirants to the
bar before the chair of law was established, was the
logical choice to be the first professor of law in the
United States. Marshall, one of his first students, read
his law from Bacon, one of Jefferson's recommended
books--and St. George Tucker, who succeeded Wythe a
decade later as second professor of law, would prepare
the first American notes to Blackstone.
The Jefferson Collection in the rare book room will,
when it is completed, replicate the law library of
Jefferson himself, much of it undoubtedly collected
under the guidance of Wythe. But the rare book room
will also preserve the artifacts and mementoes of
earlier legal studies associated with William and
Mary--photostats of the admissions of Sir John
Randolph and his sons to the hms of Court, and
eventually a facsimile reproduction of the Randolph
"conunonplace book" used at Gray's Inn in 1715.

lawyers) was never followed--it was logical to merge
the two elements of legal education. Thus the
university-level study of law introduced at Oxford in
1758, and the formal apprenticeship represented in
such centers as Gray's Inn or the Temple, simply
became two parts of the same program in the William
and Mary law curriculum. This was quite clearly set
out in the formal university "statutes" for the law
degree, which stipulated a course of study embracing
history, law and government as well as practical
examinations in specific subject-areas of the
profession.
The demand for instruction in the new American law
began to spread in the generation after indenpendence;
Justice James Wilson of the Supreme Court offered a
series of lectures, primarily on the Constitution, at the
University of Pennsyvania; Tapping Reeve's famous
proprietary school at Litchfield, Connecticut, appeared
soon after the William and Mary chair; law was an
element in the opening curriculum of the University of
Virginia in 1819; and the most famous chair to be
occupied by a jurist was probably the Dane
Professorship at Harvard, expressly created for Joseph
Story in the early 1830s. For twenty years there was a
renowned proprietary law school in Cumberland
County, Virginia, founded in 1821 by Judge Creed
Taylor; and another was operated in Winchester by one
of St. George Tucker's sons, Henry.
Another Tucker son, Beverley, brought the pre-Civil
War law program at William and Mary to its apogee in
the 18305 and 18405.' Beverley, a committed
states-rights constitutionalist, indeed gave his name to
the so-called "Southern school" of legal education in
this ante-bellum period. The curriculum was as
exacting as ever; the catalog for 1839-40 stipulated
reqUired reading in Vattel's Law of Nations, the famous
Federalist essays on the Constitution, St. George
Tucker's American notes on Blackstone, Kent's
Conunentaries, Stephens on Pleading and Starkie on
Evidence. In addition, said a course description: "A
sort of moot court is contrived by devising cases which
the students are required to conduct to issue; and
which are generally so managed as to lead to an issue of
law; on which briefs are handed in, argument heard, if
necessary, and judgments pronounced."
The crippling effects of the Civil War on the College
in general, and the law program in particular, forced a
hiatus of sixty years in the historic law program. The
modern period dates from a revival in 1922. The third
century began with the opening of the new building in
1980.

Marshall-Wythe's Jefferson Rare Book Room
The William and Mary chair was quite consciously
modeled after both the Vinerian chair at Oxford, and
the practical training offered by the Inns of Court. St.
George Tucker--who had been originally intended for
enrolhnent at the Middle Temple--in his 1803
introduction to the "American Blackstone," wrote that
until the Commentaries were published, "the students
of law in England, and its dependencies, were almost
destitute of any scientific guide to conduct their
studies." He added that "even in those Inns of Court
whither those who sought to acquire a knowledge of
the profession, generally repaired for instruction,"
teaching materials were sparse.
Since the pragmatic American approach, of necessity
in colonial times, had been to merge activities which in
the mother country had developed separately--law and
equity actions were heard in the same court, although
on different court days; and the distinction between
solicitors (office practitioners) and barristers (trial

Dr. WilJiam F. Swindler is John Marshall Professor of
Law, Emeritus, at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
Professor Swindler, a prolific author in the field of
legal history, had his most recent book, The Constitution and Chief Justice Marshall. published in 1971:1.
He is now preparing a three-volume series of studies on
the Bicentennial of American Legal Education.
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Tremors of a New Beginning
By Larry D. Willis

Another legal relationship with far-reaching
possibilities exists between the law school and the
National Center for State Courts. Each is, in a large
measure, responsible for the presence of the other. The
National Center was formerly based in Denver but was
swayed in its search for new headquarters by the idea
of close cooperation with a good law school. To be
effective, the two needed to be very close. The only
available tract of land large enough for two such
buildings was the former site of Eastern State Hospital,
given to the college when that institution moved to
Dunbar. The National Center leased its grounds from
the college for a nominal sum and started construction
in May of 1976. With such a commitment as the actual
construction, William and Mary finalized plans for the
new law school and broke ground in the Fall of 1977.
Relations between the two institutions have been
pleasant and productive. A joint committee is studying
areas of cooperation and has already hosted a very
successful symposium on "State Courts and
Federalism in the 1980's." They are also sponsoring an
essay contest for Marshall-Wythe students and are
adding to the curriculum in the realm of judicial
administration. Many current students work "next
door" and value both the experience and convenience
of their jobs there.
Student life has changed dramatically with the law
school's change of venue. Gone are the ivy-covered
walls, tree-lined brick sidewalks and convenient access
to the main campus. "Everything is under one roof
here," is a common remark. The four-building
approach of the on-campus days, including Old
Rogers, James Blair and Camm, did not promote a sense
of unity. It was difficult to think of a building with
classes in it as a body of students. First year students
were gone by noon every day; the upper-classes
seemed to meet in the afternoons; and very few of
either group chose to stay any longer than they had to.
There was little interaction between students outside of
class, the majority of students took little interest in
changing the situation.
Expanded and more pleasant surroundings are now
causing more people to spend more time at the law
school. The distance from other facilities results in
dinners to heat and eat in the lounge. Individual
lockers make it possible to keep books and other
personal belongings close at hand. Generously donated
oriental rugs and comfortable chairs create a relaxed
atmosphere in the main lobby - fine for studying, better
still for not studying. These factors combine to bring a
diverse group of 450 law students closer together.
In the air-conditioned comfort of an elaborate edifice,
it is much easier to have a positive attitude toward

Many changes have accompanied the moving of the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law from its historic setting
on the old William and Mary campus to the new
facility one mile away. Most of the differences are
readily apparent: modern building, spacious library,
comfortable classrooms. Other, more subtle, changes
include. better cooperation with the legal community,
higher student morale, and an effect on the surrounding neighborhood.
"The plusses outweigh the minuses overwhelmingly," says Dean William Spong. "Library space is our
most important addition. We now have the capacity to
seat every student; the collection is divided and
displayed to facilitiate research; and the acoustical
classrooms better lend themselves to teaching. In short,
the whole atmosphere for instruction is better."
Dean Spong cites other beneficial aspects of the new
facility including an innovative moot courtroom which
he believes contributed to the success of this year's
National Moot Court teams.
The moot courtroom itself is, in addition to
providing an fine teaching forum, attracting
considerable attention from the legal community.
Many curious attorneys and judges have toured the
facilities which are as technologically advanced as any
in the country. Already, administrative hearings have
been held there, and state hearings are imminent.
These and other contacts with the practicing bar in
Virginia are establishing relations which will benefit
Marshall-Wythe students now and in the coming years.

Marshall-Wythe's Next-Door
Center for State Courts.

Neighbor:

National
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Marshall-Wythe as a fine institution for the study of
law than it was in the flooded basement of an
inadequate library. This new found pride in a mere
building has carried over into pride in what the school
has become. what it has the potential to achieve.
Physical plant can often affect attitudes and it has done
so in this case. More students are interested in what
happens in and with their school. as evidenced by
larger voter turnout in student elections. more
involvement in special events and a willingness to
work to make the school better still.
There is a general feeling that the new law school
building is improving the academic life at MarshallWythe. Apart from the obvious advantages of
well-designed lecture rooms and outstanding library
facilties. the professional atmosphere which pervades
the building almost creates an eagerness to study. Long
hours of reading. briefing and researching are made as
painless as possible in a place which actually seems to
be designed for utility.

or receiving personal visitors who might drive by.
South Henry Street. from Francis Street to' South
Boundary. is presently zoned for limited business and
it is expected that several private offices will join
Southern Bank and C&P Telephone Co. along that side
of the street. From South Boundary Street on past the
law school. South Henry Street is now zoned
"Residentail C." This is a medium-density rating
satisfied by apartments and townhouses. Currently.
there are no apartment building or townhouses on
South Henry Street.
In the years since construction of the National Center
for State Courts and the law school. property values
have increased dramatically. The average assessed
value of all land in Williamsburg has increased
between twenty-five and thirty percent in the last few
years. The neighborhood surrounding these bastions of
higher education contains parcels which have
increased 200. 300. even 400 percent in some
instances. The city real estate assessor predicts another
twenty percent increase this year.
Increasing property taxes and the possiblity for
capital gains will force many landlords to make other
use of their property. and even many homeowners will
be unable to remain in this immediate area because of
its rising costs. Townhouse units are nearing
completion on South Boundary Street. less than a block
from the law school. It is only a matter of time before
the tight housing market in Williamsburg makes
similar construction a reality on South Henry Street.
displacing people who. in many instances. have lived
there all their lives.
The construction of the new law school building has
enriched the experience of the students by providing
better facilities and closer relations with the practicing
bar. The benefits are abundant and widespread. but
they are not given free of charge. Marshall-Wythe's
future. and the impending commercial development of
the surrounding neighborhood. will come at a great
expense to those who know nothing of Moot Court or
Federalism in the 1980·s. Increased comfort and
spacious surroundings for students will eventually
bring about discomfort and a change in surroundings
for the current neighborhood residents. The costs and
benefits have been weighed and the residents have
lost. Their involuntary sacrifice will further the goals of
urban development and academic excellence. leaving a
debt for Marshall-Wythe students to repay through
service to the community.

"Cars are the most visible and most resented aspect of
the school."
Few people in the law school community realize the
profound effect that the new building has had. and
will continue to have on the surrounding
neighborhood. Not much thought has been given to the
repercussions resulting from the intrusion each day of
hundreds of students. faculty and visitors.
Picture South Henry Street before 1976. Small
amounts of traffic travelled what more closely
resembled a country road than a city street. It was a
quiet neighborhood. traditionally and predominantly
black. nestled on the outskirts of town. Even the
presence of Eastern State Hospital failed to disrupt the
area.
It is 1981 and things have changed. Traffic is steady
now on that same road. the curb lined with overflow
from the school parking lot. Cars are. in fact. the most
visible and most resented aspect of the school. Resident
complaints of nuisance and minor property damage led
to the proliferation of "no parking" signs along the
sidestreets and beside driveways. Even now. students
deprive many from parking in front of their own homes

Larry D. Willis is a second year law student from
Portsmouth. Virginia. In 1979. he received a B.A. in
English from Hampden-Sydney College. Larry spent
his winter vacation working for the Dakota Plains Legal
Services on the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in
Ft. Yates. North Dakota. Mr. Willis is presently serving
as President of the Student Bar Association at the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
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Legal Scholarship and the Mission of a
Law Faculty
By Charles Koch and Frederick Schauer
pleasure, but the pleasure is derived from a different
source. It is a mental and emotional experience of a
wholly different kind from that produced by the
competent craftsman. Some artists, like Picasso and
Magritte, have been highly competent technical
craftsmen as well. For others, such as Van Gogh, the
technical skill is almost totally absent; but the artistic
experience and pleasure is still very much there. While
the artist's ability to produce pleasure does not
necessarily rely on mechanical gifts, mechanical
aptitude often makes it easier for the artist to express
his creative ideas. Conversely, although a craftsman
relies foremost on his technical skill, he surpasses the
boundaries of that skill when he adds to his product
that which we call artistic. Thus even in teaching the
craftsman one must nurture the artistic intuition. In
expanding the level of technical skill, one must fold in
new and different intuitive notions.
If we are to teach craftsmen we must concentrate on
the skills that craftsmen need. But these skills are
relatively easy to transmit, especially since we take
pains to find those with particular aptitude for learning
those skills. But it is the creative side of the law that is
much more difficult to teach. Indeed, the creative
- aspect is often thought to be almost completely
intuitive. Yet to a great extent the creative side of the
law is passed on from generation to generation.
Through this process the state of the art is advanced,
the societal benefit from the law increases, and the
advances in the art pass quickly intq advances in the
craft. These advances are important even to and
perhaps especially to the individual craftsman because
these advances allow the craftsman to reach beyond the
boundaries of pure technical knowledge. Strong
evidence exists for the propostion that the very best
practical lawyers are those who are both highly skilled
in their craft but who never ignore the potential for
creativity.
A major problem for the law teacher is how to convey
this creative element of the law; how to bring the
creative craftsman in touch with the creative aspects of
the craft. This educational goal is unfortunately
resisted by some elements of the craft guild of lawyers
today, yet it is an important facet of the training of
those who will soon be members of that guild.
Since the creative aspect of the law is nurtured rather
than transmitted in a simple fashion, the teacher must
have a sense of it in order to be able to nurture it in
others, particularly students. Legal scholarship, which
at its highest form is the search for new and creative
analyses of real problems, is the practice of legal
creativity in its purest form. A legal educator who
actively engages in creative scholarship is by definition

People who wish to comment pejoratively on the
values that prevail in an academic institution often
refer to the phenomenon of "Publish or Perish." By
contrast, one never hears reference to "Teach or
Perish" as a case of misplaced values. The clear
implication is that scholarly publication is little more
than an extra, and that academic institutions that
consider it vitally important have in some way mislaid
their priorities. Since this and other law schools of
equivalent prominence require scholarly publication as
well as excellence in teaching from their faculties, it
seems that either much of the popular wisdom is
wrong, or that all of the country's major law schools
. have in some way gone off the rails. Because we believe
in the importance of scholarship and research by law
faculties, we felt that it might be useful to explain the
sources of this belief.
In a way it seems bizarre that two academics should
have to defend the need for research and scholarship. If
we worked in a physics department or a chemistry
department we would find that the value of pure
research or pure thinking was recognized instantly.
Why then must law professors accept a challenge to
defend what in almost any other discipline would be
considered the backbone and the very currency of the
academic environment? The answer, perhaps fortunately and perhaps unfortunately, is complex.
Some students, some practititioners, and, interestingly, some law professors often ridicule expansive
and abstract thinking and writing by those who teach
in law schools. Legal education, it seems to many,
should produce mechanics, and thus legal educators
should engage themselves entirely in diagramming the
functioning of the machinery. No one doubts that
transmitting the technicalities, the language, and
occaSionally the secrets of the guild is a legitimate part
oHegal education. The mistake comes in assuming that
it is the only part.
Though lawyering is not an art form in the same way
that painting or sculpture is, some analogy to the visual
arts may help us to explore the relationship between
the trade school and the academy. Within the visual
arts we can. characterize two types of practitioners craftsmen and artists. Often the artists are craftsmen,
and sometimes craftsmen produce art, but the two
operate at different levels on the production of a
pleasurable visual experience. The craftsman performs
with great technical skin and dexterity. What he
produces may be valuable and indeed enjoyable to look
at regardless of whether it displays any creativity or
imagination. The value of the work produced by the
craftsman thus varies directly with the extent of the
craftsman's skill. An artist also provides visual
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is mistakenly characterized as "free" time. This free
time, however, is not really ours. Society gives us this
time so that it can be devoted to advancing the law.
Members of a law faculty, unlike most practicing
attorneys, have the time as well as the experience and
expertise to contemplate broader issues. In few other
fields of scholarly endeavor do academics have as
much influence on the development of the field.
Treatises and law review articles are frequently relied
upon and cited by the courts. Law professors are
usually prominent on committees dealing with rule
and statutory revision, restatements, and broader
proposals for law reform. Academic criticism often
exercises a significant influence on the development of
case and statutory law. While historians rarely make
history, it is clear that law professors quite often make
law.
For these reasons. a reputation of a law school is
highly correlated with the reputation of the scholarship

engaged in advancing beyond the frontiers of settled
law. Engaging in legal scholarship therefore trains the
legal educator to pass on the element of creativity to the
next generation of lawyers. Furthermore, since
creativity comes easiest when there is technical
fluency, scholarship requires the teacher to develop
technical skills in both teacher and student as the
necessary foundation for creativity.
Faculty scholarship has other direct effects on the
quality of the instruction that is offered to students.
The faculty member who is a productive scholar in the
areas in which he or she is teaching is best able to deal
with and convey a sense of the most important
contemporary problems in the field. Closely allied to
this is the fact that scholarly necessity requires the
scholar to be conversant with all of the relevant
materials and sources. Thus, active scholarship
produces the teacher who is best able to teach the
issues of today and of the future, and therefore best able
to prepare students to practice today and in the future.
Moreover, the teacher who is engaged in active
scholarship is inevitably enthusiastic about that area,
and can therefore exhibit and impart that special
enthusiasm for the subject that is essential for a
successful learning experience. It is, for all of these
reasons, a major mistake to view classroom teaching
and important scholarship as mutually exclusive. In
most cases the two activities are mutually supportive.
Although scholarship is therefore a fundamental part
of successful teaching, it cannot be evaluated on this
basis alone. Teaching is only part of the job of the
academic, and for that reason society grants to us what

produced by its faculty. Law schools that generate
impressive scholarship also produce the complete law
graduate: those who have been grounded not only in
the technical skills, but who also have had nurtured
that part of lawyering that parallels the creative aspects
of the artistic intuition. It is far from a coincidence that
students from the law schools best known for faculty
scholarship go on to the best and most challenging
legal positions. This is true even though some of these
law schools do not concentrare on technical
knowledge. As between technical skills and creative
talents, any deficiency in the first is easily remedied in
the early years of practice. but a deficiency in the
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second is virtually beyond remedy throughout the
course of legal practice. An increase in scholarship
thus justifiably increases the marketability of the
students that a law faculty sends out into the
profession.
It is the duty of a law faculty to devote much of its
time to activities that enhance the profeSSion and that
further the service the profession performs for society.
This public duty is especially important in the law. Unlike the sciences. which set their own pace for
development. the law must parallel society. It is
inevitable that society will continually change. and law
must change with society or it will fail to fulfill its
societal function. A law faculty that fails to participate
in this process of legal change has failed its public
trust.
Scholarship is therefore important to any law school
in enhancing the learning experience of its students. in
aiding the students and alumni whose careers ride on
the reputation of the school. and in performing the
function assigned to the institution by society. It is also
a crucial factor in the ability of this school to continue
to attract a highly qualified faculty and to retain the
highly qualified faculty it now has. Faculty visibility
and reputation also attract highly qualified students.
on which so much of the school depends.
Consequently. it is in the best interests of the entire law
school community and those it services that
scholarship be encouraged and enthusiastically
supported.

Assistance Project
The Marshall-Wythe School of Law's Post
Conviction Assistance Project (P-CAP) is a federally
funded legal assistance program which serves the dual
purpose of providing students with clinical experience
and assisting imprisoned individuals with their
multi-faceted legal problems. To qualify for P-CAP
services an individual must have been convicted of a
crime and be presently incarcerated. Since the Project
is federally funded. the bulk of student services are
directed-toward federally incarcerated individuals. in
particular. inmates of the Petersburg Federal
Correctional Institution. Despite this priority. the
project also offers assistance to state prisoners when
time and resources permit.
The major complaints issuing from the Petersburg
inmates are habeus corpus petitions. 1983 actions.
internal grievance and disciplinary procedure
disputes. parole hearing issues. Criminal Procedure
Rule 35 motions and detainers. Increased student
participation has enabled P-CAP to address a larger
percentage of the complaints received from inmates
this year. Nevertheless. the influx of letters and
petitions necessitate that priorities be set with respect
to requests for assistance. Priority is given to federal
inmates with complaints that do not interfere with the
prison's administrative process. If P-CAP services
cannot be provided for the particular inquiring
prisoner. a concerted effort is made to provide a referral
to alternative legal assistance resources or to advise the
inmate on how to seek resolution through exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Project members receive cases through maii
solicitation and prison visits. Each participating
member must make at least one trip to the federal
penitentiary in Petersburg per semester and multiple
visits are encouraged. Visits to the penitentiary are
arranged by the Program Director and funded by
P-CAP. Prisoners are informed of the "student
lawyers' " arrival in advance and members are often
greeted by a parade of inquiring inmates. As might be
expected. many prisoners present diverse and
apparently legitimate allegations. but some express
mundane or spurious complaints and others merely
seek conversation with "normal" outsiders.
Most of a project member's work entails interviewing
inmates. legal research of the respective issues and
informing the inmates of the results. As every inmate.
understandably. seeks to be released from prison.
project members are seldom able to assist inmates to
the full extent requested. However. they are often able
to allay inmates' fears by educating them about
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student's interests. The course is given on a passifail
basis. allowing a student to obtain one credit hour for
participation in the program.

intraprison rules or state and federal law. Recently.
P-CAP members have been allowed to represent
prisoners in parole or immigration and naturalization
hearings and the third year practice program permits
P-CAP to offer even more extensive student representation of an inmate under the supervision of a practicing
attorney.
The directors ofP-CAP have made a concerted effort
in the past year to retain a flexible format for the
program, while providing students with mor.e defi~ite
guidelines within which to structure their project
work. Three directors assume responsibility for the
project; a Program Director, a~ Ad~ini~trati~e Direct?r
and a Research Director. ThiS tllpartlte dlrecto~s~IP
controls P-CAP functions under the careful superviSIOn
of faculty member Professor John M. Levy. In addition,
P-CAP has hired a part-time attorney-consultant, Ms.
Christie Cyphers. to provide students with practical
advice concerning the more difficult problems P-CAP
encounters.
Although students are given a great deal of leeway
within which to handle their caseloads, promptness in
responding to prisoner complaints is emphasized
strongly. The major focus of the program is on the
efficient. competent and timely processing of and
response to prisoner complaints, rather than s~t~sfy~ng
any rigid course requirements. Faculty partlclpa~lOn
allows this clinical program to be offered as a credited
course at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. The only
curriculum mandate is that the project members
provide forty hours of service over the course of the
semester and attend several mandatory seminars.
These service requirements may be allocated to the
project member's various prisoner complaints as the
circumstances warrant or in accordance with the

P-CAP provides students with first-hand research
experience accrued from participation in the program,
but more significantly. it provides students with an
invaluable opportunity to obtain clinical experience
and to imbue past course work with a sense of
practicality. In addition. valuable lessons are to be
learned by all prospective lawyers who anticipate
doing pro bono work or court appointed service. Common problems encountered by project members in
interviewing inmates are communication barriers and
the prisoner's defensiveness. In their eagerness to seek
release by any means possible, inmates sometimes have
been known to distort the facts or. at least. omit those
facts most damaging to their interests. If nothing else.
students learn to elicit the essential facts despite the
communication barriers and they learn to overcome
their fears of visiting a penal institution. On the whole,
most inmates are sincere in their request for assistance.
Therefore,P-CAP students are particularly frustrated
by the prospect of delivering negative results from their
legal research. However, the most satisfying aspect of
P-CAP is the ostensible gratitude of prisoners for the
services provided by the Marshall-Wythe students.
Over the past year, greater emphasis has been placed
on versing project members in the major areas of
applicable substantive law and in familiarizing them.
through group seminars, with available research tools.
A number of seminars are scheduled each semester to
aid students in developing necessary skills and
knowledge. Seminars presented last semester included
an interviewing techniques seminar; a lecture on
relevant library resources: a film on a New Mexico
prison made shortly before a major inmate riot: a
lecture by Federal Judge Calvitt Clarke. of the Eastern
District of Virginia, on habeus corpus petitions and
1983 actions; and a discussion with prison inmates on
the rehabilitative and nonrehabilitative aspects of
prison life. Similar seminars are scheduled for this
semester including discussions with a local Prosecuting Attorney and a U.S. Parole Commission representative. Seminars are open to the public and uninhibited
discussion is encouraged. While presenting a discussion on the trials and tribulations of prolonged prison
life last semester. a group of inmates addressed the
stigmatization attached to imprisonment and openly
confronted participating students about their personal
views with regard to the moral character of inmates.
P-CAP provides an essential service to both federal
and state inmates. The Project eliminates false hopes
created by jailhouse lawyers and assists inmates in
obtaining their full legal rights. Furthermore. the
Project serves to educate and experience prospedi\'p
lawyers about the realities of dealing with our penal
system. And. hopefully. P-CAP provides. in at least a
limited fashion. a tool for facilitating change and
improvement in the federal and state correctional
systems.
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ment protection. Factors the courts have considered in
ascertaining whether the situation meets the test
include the nature of the premises or activity, the
extent of personal interest in the premises, society's
characterization of the place or activity, and the steps
taken by the person to maintain privacy.
Although what appears to be paramount in Katz is
that the government invade an individual's legitimate
expectation of privacy, more is required than the mere
violation of individual privacy. A search and seizure
must also be involved. This conclusion is supported by
the recognition in Katz that, "the Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional right
to privacy." The Court did not abolish the requirement
that a search be involved; it merely shifted its emphasis
from the actual search to the invasion of individual
privacy. In Katz, by listening to and recording Katz's
words, the government violated the privacy upon
which Katz justifiably relied, and by acquiring the
information, searched and seized the actual content of
his conversation.
In attempting to resolve whether the placement and
monitoring of a beeper is a search within the Fourth
Amendment, the courts have used varying. and inconsistent approaches. The problem lies in determining
which of these approaches best interprets the Fourth
Amendment. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have arrived

The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has always generated
a great deal of judicial controversy and confusion. The
judicial struggle continues as law enforcement
agencies begin to use complex electronic surveillance
devices. The problem arises in determining when an
actual search or seizure has occurred. Attention will be
given here to one of those devices, the beeper", and to
the determination of whether its placement and
monitoring constitutes a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Different judicial
approaches will be compared and the effect of recent
court decisions will be explored.
In applying Fourth Amendment rights and
protections, the courts originally relied upon concepts
of property law and trespass. A literal two step
approach was followed. First, the protection was
limited to searches involving an actual trespass and to
seizures comprising the taking of material objects.
Second, for a search to have occurred, a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area was
required. Although this early doctrine was expressly
repudiated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), it may not have been completely abandoned.
The nature of the intrusion and the area alleged to have
been searched still appear to be important factors.

Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment
By Ronald D. Kristobak

at completely opposite decisions.
In United States v. Holmes, 521 F. 2d 859 (5th Cir.
1975), the Fifth Circuit held that monitoring a beeper
was a search and seizure. Government agents had
attached an electronic beeper to defendant's van while
it was located in a public parking lot. The beeper
ultimately enabled the agents to locate illegal drugs in
the defendant's possession. The court found a search
and seizure within the meaning of· the Fourth
Amendment because the defendant possessed a valid
expectation of privacy while in his vehicle. The court
reasoned that although an individual may expect
surveillance when he drives his vehicle, he can
reasonably expect to be alone in his vehicle.
Essentially, the Fifth Circuit extended the Katz
rationale to monitoring the movement of motor
vehicles.
At the other end of the spectrum is the Ninth
Circuit's determination in United States v. Hufford,
539 F 2d 32, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976), that
the monitoring of a beeper in a motor vehicle is not a
search. In Hufford, a beeper was placed in a drum of
caffeine legally purchased by the defendant. A second
device was attached to the defendant's truck enabling
government agents to locate a garage where they seized
illegal drugs. The Ninth Circuit held that the
monitoring of the beeper on the truck was not a search
because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy

In Katz, government agencies attached 'a listening
device to a public telephone booth to monitor the
conversations of a suspect. The United States Supreme
Court held that such a nontrespassory invasion
constituted a search and seizure because it violated the
privacy upon which Katz justifiably relied while using
the telephone. The Supreme Court's emphasis shifted
from protecting places to protecting the individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court
interpreted the Fourth Amendment in a more abstract,
flexible manner. Mr. Justice Stewart's majority opinion
stated:
The Fourth Amendment protects people. not places. What a
person knOWingly exposes to the pUblic. even in his own home or
office. is not the subject of Fourth Amendment protection ... But
what he seeks to peserve as private. even in an area accessible to
the public. may be constitutionally protected.

Cases applying the Katz rationale have consistently
adopted the twofold test in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion finding comfort in its well-defined guidelines
and ease of application. Under Harlan's test, an
individual must have exhibited an actual subjective
expectation of privacy, and this expectation must have
been one that society was prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Besides focusing upon the actual search
and seizure, the Court considered individual expectations and societal norms in applying Fourth Amend25

continued presence of noncontraband goods in
defendant's home. When the defendant withdrew from
public view, taking the chemicals inside the house, he
had every right to expect that his activities in the house
would remain private. Since the defendant had a
justifiable expectation of privacy. the continued
monitoring of non-public information constitutes a
search.
The most recent case to confront the beeper issue is
United States v. Bailey. 628F. 2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980). In
Bailey, government agents posing as suppliers of
precursor chemicals, agreed to deliver the chemicals to
the defendant. A beeper was placed in one of the drums
which enabled agents to trace the drum to an apartment
complex, and later after losing and regaining transmission, to another apartment building. The signal was
pinpointed to a locked storage room in the complex
basement. After seventy-five days, when the beeper's
signal began to weaken, the agents secured a warrant,
later declared invalid, entered the complex and seized
the chemicals. The defendants were then indicted for
conspiracy to manufacture phencyclidine. The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the government's use of the
beeper for surveillance of noncontraband personal
property in the private areas was a search and seizure
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although the
Sixth Circuit claimed to use Katz's justifiable
expectation of privacy standard, the court invoked a
unique analysis in reaching its decision.
In Katz, because the individual legitimately expected
the information or material the government acquired to
remain private, the acquisition constituted a search and
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Katz did not
hold that every invasion of individual privacy formed
the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation. Although a
fine line existed between the two, Katz required both
an invasion of privacy and a search and seizure.
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protected privacy
only to the extent that it prohibited "unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons, houses. papers and
effects."
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit appears to
equate search and seizure with a government intrusion
of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
The court in Bailey considered irrelevant whether a
particular government intrusion was classified as a
search and seizure, but focused only upon whether the
government acts violated an individual's legitimate
expectation of pJjvacy. This general holding requiring
only an invasion of individual privacy for a search and
seizure to occur is far too broad and ignores past search
and seizure requirements. Such analysis translates the
Fourth Amendment into a general constitutional right
to privacy which is precisely the fear Justice Black
expressed in his dissent in Katz. Black feared the
Court's use of a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept
of privacy as a substitute for the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The decision in the Bailey case may, however. still
be correct, and a comparison of the decision with past
approaches is helpful. The approach taken by the Fifth

in defendant's movement and location on public roads.
The court equated the use of the beeper with visual
surveillance since the beeper only augmented what
could be done by visual surveillance alone.
Despite first impressions, the differences between
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' decisions are not
fundamental. The major distinction lies not with the
determination of when a search occurs, .but with the
determination's application to vehicular movement.
The courts arrive at different results when applying the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard to
movement. The difference springs from the analysis of
the Katz statement that "what a person knOWingly
exposes . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection." The Ninth Circuit considers movement on
a public thoroughfare as something that one could
reasonably expect to remain private. This appears to be
a far too narrow reading of Katz. The Fifth Circuit
approach embodies the entire context of the Katz
rationale. Katz also stated that "what an individual
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Thus,
although an individual may anticipate visual surveillance on public roads, he may also reasonably expect
not to have his every move traced by an electronic
device.
Other circuit court decisions have further confused
the issue. In United States v. Clayborne, 584 F. 2d 346
(10th Cir. 1978), through the aid of a beeper placed in a
drum of chemicals, government agents discovered
defendant's clandestine laboratory. The court followed
the Ninth Circuit view that the beeper merely
facilitated visual surveillance, and hence no search was
involved. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that since the
clandestine laboratory in a commerical establishment
was somewhere between a home and a motor vehicle,
the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The court also considered the fact that the
police had probable cause to believe that the illegal
activity was taking place.
A decision that resolves these apparently inconsistent approaches is United States v. Moore, 562 F. 2d
106 (1st Cr. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). In
Moore, government agents placed one electronic
device in a chemical container and another on
defendant's truck. The beepers were used to monitor
the individual's movements and to keep track of the
chemicals in defendant's possession. The First Circuit
distinguished between the use of a monitOring device
to track a vehicle and the use of such a device to
monitor the presence of chemicals in·the house. Use of
the former beeper was not considered a search because
of the· reduced expectation of privacy associated with
motor vehicles. The court also considered the fact that
the agents had probable cause for believ!ng a ~minal
enterprise was underway. On the other hand, the
beeper placed in the container was a search because it
was an invasion of the privacy of the home. The court
specified that the chemicals were not contraband or
otherwise wrongfully in defendant's possession, and
that the government had no right to monitor the
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Circuit tn United States v. Holmes, that the monitoring
of a beeper in motor vehicles is a search and seizure,
appears to be harmonious with and goes beyond
Bailey. The court in Bailey did not address the
monitoring of movement issue. The monitoring in
Bailey took place within an apartment, a traditionally
protected area. The only real difference between the
cases is the analyses used. and Bailey adds little to the
Holmes decision.
The approach of the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Hufford. while in conflict with the Holmes decision, is
consistent with Bailey.because it is distinguishable on
the facts. The Ninth Circuit confined its consideration
to the beeper attached to the truck which enabled the
agents to locate the garage, ana failed to address the
beeper in the chemical drum. As such. the court was
only concerned with the beeper's role in monitoring
movement. If the truck had been parked outside the
garage, the court would have been correct in confining
itself to the monitoring of movement issue. Yet,
because the beeper actually intruded into the confines
of the garage, the beeper not only searched defendant's
movement, but also his property.
On the other hand, the court in Bailey concerned
itself with the beeper's intrusion into a private place.
defendant's apartment. Although an individual may
have a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
operated in public, he has a justifiable expectation of
privacy within his apartment. In Bailey, since there
cmildJ:ie no plain view of the object, the government
would have been unable to acquire information not
otherwise publicly available without the aid of the
beeper. Therefore, Bailey presents a situation in which
the Ninth Circuit may follow the Fifth Circuit and
reach a similar result--the monitoring of an electronic
tracking device in one's home is a search in violaion of
the Fourth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit decision in United States v.
Clayborne appears more difficult to reconcile. In
Clayborne, the court relied partially upon the fact that
the government had a probable cause belief that illegal
activity was taking place. The government in Bailey
may al~o have had a strong probable cause argument. If
Bailey had relied on probable cause alone, a contrary
result may have been reached. But, the Sixth Circuit,
like most courts, did not address the issue of probable
cause in detennining whether the beeper was a search.
Also, Bailey may be distinguished from Clayborne
on the facts. The laboratory in Clayborne was a
commercial establishment that was susceptible to
outside viewing and accessible to the public.
Therefore. it is arguable that the defendant in
Clayborne had no reasonable expectation of privacy. In
Bailey the government intruded into defendant's
apartment thus satisfying both the Katz requirements
since it was a private establishment in which no illegal
activities were occurring.
Finally, Bailey appears to be totally consistent with
the decision of the First Circuit in United States v.

Moore. Both cases involved the placement of a beeper
in a drum. of noncontraband chemicals and
monitorization of the beeper within a private area. Both
courts concluded that there was a justifiable
expectation of privacy under such circumstances.
Bailey. however, confronts only one of the issues
presented in Moore--the status of a beeper installed in a
container that is later taken into a private area. It is
unclear whether the court in Bailey would have
followed the lessened expectancy of privacy in motor
vehicles approach. The Bailey opinion states that it did
not "establish a blanket rule that beeper monitoring of
individual movement always brings the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment into play," although a
concurrring opinion strongly urged that the privacy of
movement is protected. As these comparisons show,
the Bailey result is entirely consistent with past
decision.
At this point, an analysis of the root of the problem,
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is in
order. The Fourth Amendment states that, "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated ... " The crux of the problem lies
with the proper definitions of search and- seizure. A
search is defined as a prying into of that which one has
a right to and intends to conceal. A seizure implies a
taking or removal of something from the possession,
actual or constructive, of another. The primary
question is, then, whether a beeper is to be classified as
an aid to visual surveillance or as an unreasonable
search and seizure.
. The contrasting view of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
stem from this categorization of electronic tracking
devices. The Ninth Circuit in Hufford equated the
beeper with visual surveillance, and since visual
surveillance did not constitute a search, an electronic
tracking device furnishing similar information also did
no constitute a search. Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit
considered the tracking device much more intrusive
than mere visual surveillance; its characteristics of
attachment, continuity and duration of monitoring,
and ability to trace location in private and public areas
distingUished it from visual surveillance and made it a
search.
In support of the conclusion that the beeper is
equivalent to visual surveillance, it is argued that the
beeper is capable of revealing only location and
movement and, therefore, is no more intrusive than
traditional visual tailing. The only location infonnation the beeper conveys is that the monitored item
entered specific private property. Thus, the government intrusion stops at the door of the constitutionally
protected area. In this light, the beeper is similar to
binoculars, tracking dogs, radar and search lights. The
counterargument is that the beeper does much more
than facilitate visual observation. Because the beeper
goes where the law enforcement officer cannot go
without violating the Fourth Amendment and acquires
infonnation not publicly visible, the beeper's locatio.n
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within a constitutionally protected area is a search.
It is difficult to perceive how the use of the beeper in
Bailey cannot be considered a search and seizure. The
beeper phYSically intruded into a place protected by
the Fourth Amendment, and it acquired information
not publicly visible in which the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The defendants
exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy by
bringing the monitored drum into the apartment's
locked storage room. Since the drum contained
noncontraband chemicals. the defendants expectation
was one that society should recognize as reasonable.
Also. the beeper's physical intrusion and acquisition of
private information constituted requisite search and
seizure to fulfill the Katz requirements.
In search and seizure cases, the court must balance
the individual's right to privacy with the government's
right of lawful intrusion necessary to enforce our
nation's laws. A holding that every private invasion is
a search and seizure tips the scale too far in favor of
individual privacy inerests since every type of
government surveillance would constitute a privacy
invasion and. hence, a search and seizure. The specific
holding in Bailey that beeper surveillance of
noncontraband property in private areas constitutes a
search and seizure strikes a justified balance. The
decision does not foreclose government opportunity to
use a beeper, but only requies that a valid search
warrant be obtained before a beeper is installed.
Most courts will probably continue to follow the Katz
rationale requiring both an invasion of individual
privacy and a search and seizure to invoke Fourth
Amendment protection. Nearly all courts will consider
electronic tracking devices taken into constitutionally
protected areas as searches and seizures. However. the
cases indicate that some couts are unwilling to afford
Fourth Amendment protection to the movement of
motor vehicles. Whether the alleged privacy invasion
occurs in a home. automobile or telephone booth.
Fourth Amendment protection may be involved. In
order for the Katz pronouncement that, "the Fourth
Amendment protects people" to have any substance.
Fourth Amendment protection should be invoked
whenever a search and seizure is involved and an individual's reasonable privacy interest is invaded.

Shield Laws . ..
ruled that the phrase "in the course of gathering or
obtaining news for publication" qualified the
definition of "news". The court reasoned that only
information upon which published stories are based
fall within the statutory protection. The court. in
addition. attached a requirement of confidentiality
withthe source. Here, the court ruled. the manuscript
was not obtained under "a cloak of confidentiality."
The court also found that in this case the privilege had
been waived via publication of the letter itself.
The court also established a positive burden of proof
for a reporter who claims the privilege:
In order to raise successfully the claim of privilege. two essential
elements must be established; first. this information or its source
must ba imparted to the reporter under a cloak of q:.nfidentiality.
i.e .• upon an understanding. express or implied. that the information or its sources will not be disclosed; and second. that the
information. or its sources must be obtained in the course of gathering news for publication.

The court, through its narrow interpretation of the
statutory language, created Ii rebuttable presumption
against the privilege. The reporter could only
overcome this presumption by meeting the two-part
test.
Within three years of Wolf the New York courts
began questioning the constitutionality of the shield
law. In People v. Monroe 17 the court questioned
whether the shield law represented an unconstitutional
intereference by the legislature with the contempt
powers of the court, a violation of the principle of
separation of powers. This attack against the shield
lawll which only granted a protection from contempt
had been coined by the California Court of Appeals in
1971. The New York court also raised the possibility
that the shield law was an unconstitutional defiance of
the Bronzburg ruling. The 1975 amendments placed
the law's validity "in greater doubt than ever before."
the court stated.
The most recent judicial pronouncements on the
statutory newsman's privilege focus primarily on the
issues of confidentiality and waiver. In each of the last
four years a New York Supreme Court has ruled that a
reporter may not claim the privilege unless he can
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information or its source was imparted to him under a
cloak of confidentiality, i.e., an expressed or implied
understanding. Of secondary importance, because it
was easier to prove. was the required showing that the
reporter had been gathering news for publication when
he received the subpoenaed information.
In each of the four cases the privilege was ruled to
have been waived for various reasons. In one case the
privilege was waived when one source met with
members of the prosecutor's staff and the other spoke to
reporters at public meeting in the town hall without an

* The beeper is a miniature. battery-powered radio transmitter that
emits recurrent signals at a set frequency. By attaching tha beeper
to an individual's property and monitoring tha signal. the police
can electronically track the property and the subject.
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1974. Under the amended shield law, in addition to the
source, the report&r was protected from disclosing any
unpublished information obtained while gathering
information for communication to the public. The
requirement in the original law that the information
related to the reporter by the source had to be
published or broadcast was deleted. These amendments placed the California shield law in line with
some of the other more progressive laws.
The first major court test of the California shield law
occurred in 1971. 19 This case grew out of the
prosecution of Charles Manson and his co-defendents
for two sets of multiple murders. Early in the
proceedings the court issued an Order re Publicity,
prohibiting any attorney, court employee, attache or
witness from releasing for public dissemination the
content of any testimony that might be given a't trial.
Farr, a reporter for the Los Angeles Herald Examiner
received copies of prospective testimony of a
prosecution witness from three persons involved in the
litigation. Much of the information contained in the
leaked testimony was printed by the newspaper,
despite the fact that most of it was not admitted as
evidence at trial.
After judgment the court convened a hearing to
determine the source of the Herald Examiner story.
Farr topk the stand and acknowledge that two of the
sources were among the six attorneys-of-record in the
trial. Farr refused to identify the third source, even
though he admitted that this person was also subject to
the court order. Farr based his refusal to answer on the
.state's shield law, but the trial court cited him for
contempt.
The California Court of Appeals, in affirming the
contempt citation, found no need to determine the
proper construction of the language of the shield law. It
ruled that to grant Farr an immunity on these facts
would countenance an unconstitutional interference
by the legislative branch with an inherent and vital
power of the court to control its own proceedings and
officers. The court stated:

·expressed or implied understanding of confidentiality.
In two other cases the privilege was deemed waived
when the reporter's source testified either at trial or
before the grand jury. In the most recent case the court
considered the reporter's intention to write a book on
the incident a waiver of the privilege.
The New York courts also took an increasingly
narrow approach to the scope of the words
"professional journalist." In People v. LeGrond18 the
individual who claimed the privilege was an author of
books, magazine articles, documentary films and news
broadcasts and a winner of the 1967 Peabody Award for
television journalism. He was subpoenaed while
preparing a television special on organized crime. The
court refused to recognize him as a professional
journalist under the statute. The colrect test for who
qualifies as a professional journalist focuses on who the
claimant's employer is, not the content of the material
or the background of the claimant, the court stated. The
court may have been trying to avoid the impermissible
examination of the content of the publication, but in
doing so, set up a narrow test based on employment.
This approach assures only that the state's "establishment press" can seek the protection of the privilege
and it may, in fact, exclude many others who should be
protected in keeping with the statute's policy of encouraging a robust dialogue.
New York may be the home of the country's most
respected newspaper, but in the state's courts, neither
the press nor the privilege receive much respect. The
statutory privilege has been severely deflated by the
courts, and may be declared unconstitutional in the
future. The institution of a strong privilege in New
York can only occur through two scenarios: the
amendment of the present statute, perhaps along the
lines of New Jersey's new law, or, following
California's lead, the addition of the statutory language
to the state's constitution. Neither seems likely in the
near future,
California
In California the newsman's privilege was enacted
into law in 1965. As in New York, the legislative
mandate soon suffered a series of setbacks in the state's
courts. But in California the legislature and general
populace responded to the courts' attacks on the
privilege, and elevated the reporter's protection to the
constitution by adding it to the state's first amendment
in last June's primary.
California's original shield law only protected the
source of any information procured for publication or
broadcast and actually used in this manner. But the
statute was rather broad in its coverage. Any publisher,
editor, reporter or other person connected with or
employed upon or by a newspaper, press association,
wire service, radio or television could claim the
privilege. The privilege could be asserted anywhere,
but was necessarily qualified in that it only protected
reporters from citation for contempt.
The law's protection was expanded and its strict
publication requirement eased through amendment in

The power of contempt possessed by the courts is inherent in their
constitutional status. While the Legislature can impose reasonable
restrictions upon the exercise of that power or the procedure by
which it may be exercised. it cannot "declare that certain acts shall
not constitute a ... contempt.

The court reasoned that the extension of the privilege
to Farr by the legislature would violate the principle of
separation of powers because it would severely impair
the trial court's performance of a constitutionally
compelled duty to control its own officers. Here the
court had attempted to protect the defendant's
constitutional rights by issuing the order. Once issued,
the court was bound to explore any violations of its
order by its own officers. And without the ability to
compel Farr to reveal his source the court would be
powerless to diScipline violaters. In conclusion the
court added that the Supreme Court's mandate that the
trial courts control prejudicial publicity emanating
from "court sources," could only be properly
discharged
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publication for the privilege to exist. fifteen do not
require it, and the other laws are silent on the matter.
shield laws quite narrowly, often depriving reporters of
their protection.
The twenty-six laws differ with regard to persons and
media covered and in other qualifications to the
pri vilege. 21
But a discernable trend at the state level indicates
that the nation's privileges may have one common
feature. Generally, the state courts are. interpreting .the
To alleviate the inconsistencies among the state
privileges, some have suggested the adoption of a
federal shield law based on either the interstate
commerce clause or the enforcement of the First
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. 22
The proposal's major positive attribute is uniformity.
Critics cha~ge that any attempt to further legislate the
privilege might encourage additional attempts by the
government to regulate the press. Others argue that
drafting such legislation would be an impossible task
because of the problems of definition, balancing, and
scope. They claim a workable result is impossible. 23
Since the Congress already declined to pass a federal
testimonial privilege when it promulgated the Federal
Rules of Evidence, it is very unlikely that a federal
shield law will be passed by Congress in the near
future.
About forty years ago Justice Hugo Black wrote,
"Free speech and fair trials are two of the most
cherished policies of our civilization and it would be a
trying task to choose between them. 24 Black
acknowledged that in a criminal trial these two
freedoms often conflict, and that the only test a court
could apply to safeguard both was one based on balancing.2S

if the courts are able to compel disclosure of the origins
of such publicity.
The result inFarrwas followed in Rosato v. Superior
Court 20 •The court ordered the jailing of three Fresno Bee
staff members for refusing to answer questions about a
series of articles in the paper quoting passages from a
sealed grand jury transcript. The court ruled that the
privilege, although still valid, was not applicable when
the questions asked the reporter tend to identify who, if
anyone, among those subject to a court order, may have
violated it. The judge cited the Farr reasoning; that the
separation of powers doctrine prohibited the
legislature from telling the courts that certain acts did
not constitute contempt. Cases in two of California's
other appellate districts also went against newsmen
basing their refusal to answer questions on the
statutory privilege.
The results in these cases led proponents of an
absolute shield law to seek the inclusion of the
newly-amended law in the state constitution. The
result of this effort was Proposition 5, which took the
amended version of the law and elevated it to a part of
the state's first amendment. Proposition 5 appeared on
the ballot in June. Proponents of the measure contended that the constitutional amendment solved the
court's separation of powers argument. Opponents
argued that the amendment was defective in two respects; first, it did not specifically state that court control of the contempt power is not paramount to the
amendment's protection, and second, that the amendment does not guarantee that its provisions cannot be
overridden by the fifth and sixth amendments of the
Constitution. The state's voters approved the amendment in June by a three-to-one margin (4.3 million to
1.5 million).
The California courts, like those in New York had
effectively circumvented. the legislatively mandated
privilege with a separation of powers argument. The
elevation of the privilege to the state's first amendment
can be considered a signal to the state courts that
public policy supports an absolute newsman's
privilege. But how effective the constitutional privilege
will be in practice is not yet clear. The impact of
Proposition 5 has yet to be tested. in the California
courts.
Conclusion
This survey of various state approaches towards
granting a testimonial privilege to reporters and the
judicial interpretations of them seems to lead to only
one indisputable conclusion: the protection afforded
reporters from disclosure of confidential sources and
information varies depending upon the jurisdiction.
Journalists across the country face differing degrees of
judicial interference with their newsgathering
activities.
The statutes themselves differ markedly. Thirteen of
them protect only the source. The others protect
information and sources. Six statutes require
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Where a reporter refuses to answer questions in a
court of law. the press' first amendment right to gather
news and the public's right to be informed must be
balanced against the interests of the defendant and the
public in a fair trial. Only a case-by-case balancing
approach. perhaps something along the lines of that
suggested by Justice Stewart in Branzburg. will
acconunodate the conflicting interest. New Jersey's
shield law - legislatively mandated balancing - offers a
good example of one approach. It remains to be seen
whether other states follow this approach though. No
clear trend as to the future of the newsman's privilege
is presently apparent.
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10.

2.

3.

The New Jersey court made some alterations. It made the test
applicable to all parties seeking disclosure from a reporter.
In addition. the court Significantly eased the burden on the
party seeking disclosure must show (1) there is a reasonable
probability or likelihood that the information sought is
material and relevant; (2) the materials cannot be secured
through any less intrusive source; and (3) there is a legitimate
need to see and use the information. Farber at 338.

FOOINOTES
408 U.S. 665 (1972). The opinion decides three companion
cases. Bronzburg v. Hayes. In re Pappas and United States v.
Caldwell.
.
Reporter Branzburg also claimed privilege under the Kentucky
shield law. KY. REV. STAT. 421.100 (1972). The Kentucky
Court of Appeals 'construed the statute as protecting anly the
source of the information and not the personal observations of
a reporter. Bronzburg v. Pound. 461 S.W. 2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
Justice White:
Fair and effective law enforcement ... is a fundamental function of government. and the grand jury plays an important.
constitutionally mandated role in this process ... (W)e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings
is insufficient to ovenide the consequential. but !lflcertain.
burden 01'1 news gathering that is said to result from insisting
that reporters. like other citizens. respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.
408 U.S. 665. 690-692 (1972).

4.

In dissent in Branzburg. Justice Stewart wrote:
(W)hen a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and
reveal confidences. I would hold that the government must
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman ·has information that is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information.
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Editor's Note:
Legal education in America has entered its third
centulY, the law school has moved into a new building
and, on a grander scale, the law itself is changing. Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the study of law is
its perpetual change; the law is not static. This
magazine attempts to capture that mixture of past and
future which determines the present state of our law at
any given time.
On a local level, articles examine the new law school
and its impact on students and neighbors.
On a national level, we explore the use of electronic
tracking devices, a technological development the
Founding Fathers could never have imagined yet,
somehow, seem to have provided for in the Fourth
Amendment. The amazing responsiveness of the U.S.
Constitution to a burgeoning society and society's
efforts to live with that vital document are themes of
other articles.
On an international perspective, rights to deep
seabed resources are considered in relation to a proposed United Nations treaty regulating the use of such
resources.

To play some role in the development of such law is
the goal of students at Marshall-Wythe. Their role,
their activities and the role of the faculty in preparing
them to meet this challenge are the subjects of the
balance of this issue. We offer the views of students
and faculty from Marshall-Wythe, and the thoughts
and statements of Chief Justice Warren Burger of the
United States Supreme Court as compiled in an article
by his research assistant. Dr. Jeffrey B. Morris.
This issue of The Colonial Lawyer is.our first effort at
such a publication. We have learned much in the
course of creating it, and we look forward to returning
the magazine to semi-annual publication next year.
The world is indeed a transitolY place and the law is
an ever-changing part of man's world. We hope to have
captured a few relevant moments of it for you.
We offer sincere thanks to all those who helped in so
many ways and, particularly, the Publications Office
and the Publications Council of the College of William
and MalY.

Diane Brooke Loeffler
Allen Richard Grossman
Co-Editors-In-Chief
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